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Maj-Gen Lyubimov Responds to Arbatov Critique of Armed Forces

90UM0059A Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 16, Aug 89
(Signed to press 7 Aug 89) pp 21-26

[Article by Major-General Yu. Lyubimov, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor, entitled: "On Defense Sufficiency and A Shortage of Competence: Polemical Notes".]

[Text] The journal *MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN* (No 3, 1989) published an article by A.G. Arbatov, "How Much Defense is Sufficient?" In it an attempt is made to consider the problem of defensive sufficiency. The judgments and conclusions in the article are far from unarguable. Thus the author labels the army nothing less than the "most command-administrative subdivision of the entire command-administrative system" and speaks of the idea that "our measures exert the most direct influence...on the development of the military potential of probably opponents," our military policy supposedly impedes perestroika, and so forth. It is no wonder that this article elicited from many military scholars a desire to express their opinions on the problem as a whole and on the article in particular. Thus Major-General Yu. Lyubimov asked *MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN* to publish an article that argues with that of A.G. Arbatov. No discussions, however, took place. *MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN* did not open its pages for a continuation of the discussion of this important, timely subject. Then the military scholar submitted his article to *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*. The editors found it possible to publish it.

ON DEFENSE SUFFICIENCY AND A SHORTAGE OF COMPETENCE

In recent years our country has been restructured on the basis of principles of democratization and glasnost and more openness. These processes are taking place in the USSR Armed Forces as well. The Army is a part of the society which cannot be separated from the people. Perestroika is proceeding to the advantage of the Armed Forces and contributing not only to increasing the political activity of the personnel, but also to improving their skills and strengthening the combat readiness of the Army and Navy.

Army life is being discussed extensively in the press. At a meeting with the leaders of the mass media, ideological institutions, and creative unions Comrade M.S. Gorbachev noted that perestroika is a "creative process; it has its own dialectic, its own contradictions, its own drama. There is no hiding the fact that both in the press and in the society as a whole one finds confusion in analysis and assessments." Hasty analysis and superficial assessments have not bypassed army life either. And here one should be especially attentive to the discussion

of issues in the mass media for they affect the interests of the country's defensive capability.

First of all one should note that the problem of reasonable sufficiency of defense has been considered by various organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense and a number of other departments. As we know, the countries of the Warsaw Pact coordinated, adopted, and published the defensive doctrine which is now guides the fraternal countries in the organizational-development of their armed forces. The USSR has adopted the most important unilateral decisions: concerning the unacceptability of the first use of nuclear weapons, on refraining from testing antisatellite weapons, and on a significant reduction of the armed forces. A Soviet-American Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles [INF Treaty] is in effect. The Soviet Union has made far-reaching proposals in negotiations on nuclear and space weapons and conventional armed forces. Behind all this stands an immense amount of analytical work.

It is difficult not to see the consequences of this work as well—the overall relaxation of international tension, the erosion of the "image of the enemy," the process of gradual regulation of prolonged local conflicts, and the growth of mutual trust. The arms race has been given a red light. The conviction is becoming stronger throughout the world: To continue to move toward it is extremely dangerous.

And one must note something else: it has become possible to use a significant share of the resources to solve the food problem and to increase the output of high-quality consumer goods. The point of departure for such decisions is, of course, a deep and comprehensive understanding of the problem of defensive sufficiency.

Unfortunately, the article "How Much Defense Is Sufficient?" does not advance us either toward an understanding of the principles of the new defensive organizational-development nor to realistic proposals concerning the need for expenditures on arms. It does not give an answer to the question: how much defense actually is sufficient?

Above of all let me note: the article, which claims to give a critical assessment of the principles of Soviet military doctrine, evokes real confusion among specialists. It is difficult to assume that the author does not have information to the effect that our army is already radically transforming its structure on the basis of the new military doctrine. Strategic views on the use of the armed forces and on their role in the prevention of future military conflicts are changing. New tactical methods of battle are being developed with respect to the defensive doctrine. This is a large investigation process which is based on the creativity of our command and political cadres. Military academies, staffs, and military institutions are engaged in it. Finally, one cannot but mention the democratization of the entire way of army life and the establishment of glasnost and openness. In spite of all

this, in the aforementioned article our army is called nothing other than "the most command-administrative subdivision of the entire command-administrative system." If the author is sufficiently informed or competent in military affairs, he cannot but know that a large number of scientists, designers, and researchers from the most diverse departments, including the USSR Academy of Sciences, are enlisted in the development of the future paths of our military organizational-development. (Let the editors of the magazine MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN and the author of the article not construe our remark as an attempt to designate some zone beyond criticism.)

It is impossible to agree with the leitmotif of the article: perestroika and glasnost are bypassing our defense policy. "Both in the economy and in USSR foreign policy," the author writes, "deep restructuring is already in progress and military policy should not impede these processes but should actively be engaged in them." Indeed, in foreign policy our most significant initiatives encompass the military area as well. And if one is to speak about restructuring in the economy as deep and already in progress, the conversion of a considerable proportion of the defense industry is a most rapid and marked contribution to the restructuring of the national economy.

As an initial thesis for his judgments the author took the assertion that "defense has gotten out of the control of the society whose interests it was intended to serve." Therefore, he suggests, "taking a fresh look at the stagnant directive circumstances and the entrenched narrow departmental approaches, and bringing military theory and practice more strictly in line with, first, the economic, second, the international-political, and, third, the military-strategic realities of the present day." It is impossible not to agree with the author when he says that the conditions for restructuring in our country require more glasnost in all areas, including the military. An intelligent discussion can undoubtedly contribute to avoiding the possible mistakes we have made in the past, including in military organizational-development. But opinions must be substantiated, and this, unfortunately, is not being done. The article does not contain any serious attempt to persuade the reader. Instead of this it gives a system of ready-made principles as though they were quite obvious.

For example, the article raises the idea of contradictions between the goals of the military policy and diplomatic dialogue, that our military programs "strictly regulate conditions for the diplomats," "people, departments, and scientific centers that are directly responsible for these negotiations and interrelations are simply obliged to adapt their viewpoint to the formation of our military course." Otherwise they will be doomed simply to a post facto "disentanglement" of the consequences of these actions with whose adoption they had nothing to do, and with the necessity of eliminating a "clash" of foreign political plans and military measures. At the present time, it is asserted later in the article, "the system that

materializes in itself the confrontation and rivalry of more than three decades of cold war keeps us from reducing our direct excessive military-political involvement in international conflicts" and restricts "diplomatic flexibility (in spite of the efforts of our diplomats) and impedes the advancement of Soviet initiatives toward the formation of an all-encompassing security system."

It seems that all these ideas are far from the truth. Our diplomats, society, and state could hardly accept such irresponsible assessments. And here is why. Does the author really not know that decisions regarding all the most important issues of defense policy are thoroughly considered by the USSR Defense Council and adopted by the government? The sphere of disarmament negotiations is also always within view of our party leadership. And before one or another decision is made, all these questions are carefully considered by all interested departments and organizations, including scientists. Let us refer to the opinion of a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee E.A. Shevardnadze regarding this question: "The determination and formation of the country's foreign political course are the function of party and state leadership... The adoption of decisions regarding them is a process that is extraordinarily interesting and profoundly creative, in which all members of the political leadership participate. The initiative for all the most important foreign political action proceeds from the Politburo and the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. For certain priority areas the Politburo creates working groups and commissions. Such, for example, is the commission that is coordinating the formulation of positions for disarmament negotiations."

The section of the article on military-strategic realities shows that the author is fairly far removed from such realities and an understanding of strategy. The section gives "concrete adjustments to the strategy of defensive sufficiency" under new conditions. The author's "directive" principles can be reduced to the following: until nuclear arms are eliminated, the mission of the strategic forces is not the defeat of an aggressor's armed forces, but rather the inflicting of a crushing retaliatory strike on vital centers; a prolonged conventional war is impossible and therefore, the main mission is to prevent an enemy victory via short-term military actions; there is little probability of a war on two fronts. Then comes the warning that our actions should not provoke an intensification of the programs of the opposing side. Moreover A.G. Arbatov tries to convince the readers that "our measures exert the most direct influence" on "the development of the military potential of probable opponents."

However, the reality is that **now our policy in the area of defense, and our strategy, and our practical actions are directed toward preventing war, both nuclear as well as conventional.** Herein lies the core of Soviet military doctrine. It is toward this that all USSR peace initiatives are directed. As concerns the author's ideas about the

direct influence of our measures on the development of the military potential of likely opponents, whether he likes it or not, this leads to the idea that our practical actions were the cause of the arms race. There is no way we can agree with this.

The irrefutable facts both in the past and in the present show something else. Let us recall, for example, the recent policy statement of the new U.S. Secretary of Defense R. Cheney. In his words, the United States of America must maintain a "position of strength" in negotiations both on conventional arms and on strategic arms. R. Cheney is against reducing the military budget, he supports continuation of the work on the SDI program, and he is an opponent of unilateral steps for arms reduction on the part of the United States. Only the continuation of USSR self-disarmament suits him. And he interprets our large unilateral reductions of armed forces and arms as a lack of "a significant reduction of USSR potential." The United States of America continues to follow a line [directed] toward gaining unilateral advantages in negotiations even after the latest peace initiatives of the Soviet Union.

The American "concept of competition" stipulates that under conditions of the maintenance of stability and of fixed military expenditures, the United States, when planning future weapons development, should give priority to those developments which would provide not only for the achievement of U.S. military superiority but also the profound economic exhaustion of the USSR. According to the Pentagon's plan, this should lead to a reduction of the Soviet Union's ability to take prompt and flexible measures to provide for its own security.

Comparing the strategic weapons of the two opposing countries, A.G. Arbatov uses a thesis from Western information sources concerning the "inadequacy" of responsive actions of the USSR in the arms race that is being imposed on it. Supporting this thesis, the author of the article in MEZHODUNARODNAYA ZHIZN correspondingly draws incorrect conclusions concerning the ratio between the quantities of new systems of strategic offensive weapons introduced recently in the USSR and the United States, including among them our modernized variant of the RS-12 ICBM and the Tu-95 bomber and for some reason forgetting about such American systems as the Trident-2 SLBM, the B-2 strategic bomber, and the modifications of the B-52 bomber for cruise missiles.

While pointing out these obvious imprecisions, it is important to emphasize that the USSR, in all stages of the arms race that has been imposed on it, has spoken out against developing new strategic weapons—the B-1, the "Trident", and the "Ohio" submarine, and also cruise missiles with all modes of basing and other systems. Therefore, it would hardly be fair to accuse the USSR of an "excessive" reaction to the actions of the United States. Our reaction has always been forced and responsive, when our proposals concerning banning new systems have been rejected by U.S. leadership.

Both new and long-known general principles of "nuclear deterrence" figure in A.G. Arbatov's article. But, judging from everything, the author does not have a clear understanding of this "deterrence." He thinks that all one needs is one mobile, land-based ICBM system and "for insurance"—one new long-range, submarine-launched missile system, or under any conditions one can maintain for a retaliatory strike 400 megaton-sized nuclear warheads and "defense capability will be ensured." Let us say directly that this approach is too superficial to give an answer to such a complicated question: "How much defense is sufficient?" But this does not bother the author very much. He recommends having an armaments ratio between the USSR and the United States of "one to two." Thus, in his judgment peace will be ensured. See how simple it is to solve the problem of the level of defensive sufficiency!

It would seem that the process of disarmament will be considerably more complicated than it is as painted with the "life-like" oil paints of A.G. Arbatov.

The author does not seriously try to figure out the extremely complicated links among the problems of strategic stability, military parity, and military superiority. And he does not ask the question of whether or not it is possible for the appropriate conditions for disarmament to exist. Is it always possible to count on warning systems and the promptness of notification and decision-making? And the fact that the United States in addition to its triad of strategic offensive forces is working intensively on weapons under the Star Wars program generally escapes Arbatov's attention. How are we to understand this?

The author practically denies completely the need for an air defense system. He declares the suitability of an air defense system in a conventional war is a "post facto justification for the system." He suggests replacing the existing system with a "modest system" of air defense for early warning, protection of the skies from terrorists during peace time, and protection of troops "at an operational-tactical non-nuclear level." To support his conclusions A.G. Arbatov gives certain data about the air defense systems in the USSR and the United States. In this he completely ignores the main thing—the difference in the geostrategic positions of the USSR and the United States. He does not take into account that American, and not only American, aviation is based at numerous military facilities located along practically all the perimeter of the USSR borders. The Soviet Union and its allies have no military air bases located near the territory of the United States.

He does not take into account the further growth of the forces of U.S. strategic aviation (B-52, B1-B, B-2, Stealth). The author also tries to disarm his potential opponents with this argument: "The use of heavy bombers for nonnuclear raids on the USSR is not mentioned in official sources. Even if there were secret plans for this, they would be clearly absurd and to respond to them would be no less absurd."

Try to figure this out, innocent reader! But the author himself should figure it out first. At the present time the United States has a strategic aviation grouping of approximately 600 units which can be equipped with both nuclear as well as conventional warheads. And the Pentagon does not intend to reduce it. Calculations show that in terms of the bomb load this grouping could deliver to the other side's territory in one flight, the United States has at least a 10-fold advantage. One asks: Is it possible not to take this into account?

Further. Instead of the one missile defense complex permitted by the ABM Treaty, the author considers it expedient to have a "thin" protective shield over the entire territory of the country—"for protection from attacks of terrorists, other potential nuclear powers, and unsanctioned and random missile launches." But actually this would mean a rejection of the nonexpiring ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union is resolutely against this position. And the author seems to be advising making it "unshakeable." This clearly does not add up. This is the first thing.

Second, the creation of even the "thinnest shield" of ABM's over the country's territory will bring about a responsive reaction from the other side and lead to a race of strategic offensive weapons. Should he be making such poorly thought-out recommendations?

In the section on conventional arms the author boldly constructs a security system based on the "intensive" path(?). It, in our view, is so indicative that we should like to present its basic principles. In A.G. Arbatov's opinion, a deeply echeloned defense, including in the European part of the USSR, can be reliably provided by 50-60 Warsaw Pact divisions, and the southern and northern flanks will be covered. They will be able to successfully oppose 100 NATO divisions. Yet to cover the 800-kilometer Central European front takes 20-30 Warsaw Pact divisions... The cumbersome system of mobilization procedures in industry will be abolished. Stocks of obsolete arms and equipment will be eliminated. The war will be quick and highly technological. There will be every opportunity for counteroffensive actions. In keeping with the defensive strategy for the air force there is to be a reduction of the resources for attacks on objects in the rear and airfields by the other side. The navy will limit its missions to defending the coast and protecting ships with long-range missiles in the coastal seas. All the NATO aircraft carriers will sink to the bottom at our coast. Missile carrying aircraft will be used only within the radius of operation of resistance fighters.

It would seem sufficient to give these excerpts from the text without commentary. Do these proposals not remind the reader of the projects of a certain Gogol hero?

Evidently it would be impossible to find a person in our country who does not want peace and arms reduction. But we must under no circumstances lose sight of the

problem of security. Whether the author of the article meant it or not, he is certainly not suggesting equal security for the USSR and the United States. Hence the conclusion: There cannot be sufficient defense without sufficient security. And it is not at all a matter of a "critical shortage" of information on the Armed Forces. In order actually to aid defense construction one needs objectivity, competence, and qualifications. Without these the answers to the extremely complicated question "How much defense is sufficient?" cannot contain constructive suggestions for the restructuring of policy that is taking place in the area of defense.

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Military View of Law on Lithuanian Citizenship

90UM0141A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
-- Oct 89 p 2

[Article by V. Zaychenko, deputy military procurator, Vilnius Garrison: "...But Obligated to Be a Citizen"]

[Text] The second version of the draft law "On Lithuanian SSR Citizenship" is being actively discussed today in our press. We are receiving many questions, responses and proposals, and this is not surprising, since after all, the subject of citizenship is perhaps more troubling to every inhabitant of our republic than any other. The discussion continues. We turn over the floor to a military lawyer.

In the legal understanding of the entire legislative system, the law "On Lithuanian SSSR Citizenship" is most important, it is pivotal in regard to many matters—it determines, you see, the legal position of a citizen and his relationship to the state, and it is the foundation on which the system of social relations is erected, on which government organs, the elective system and so on are erected. Also important is the fact that this law serves as the basis for creating other laws of the republic, inasmuch as it introduces the concept of "Lithuanian SSR citizen," imparting to him specific rights and obligations—that is, a particular status.

Such detailed regulation of the system of "citizen-state" legal relations had not been previously observed on the scale of the USSR. The 1977 USSR Constitution (Article 33) establishes only union citizenship. Every citizen of a union republic is a citizen of the USSR. The norm of this article contained the blanket (reference) principle that the grounds and the procedure of acquisition and loss of citizenship are determined by the Law on Citizenship. Therefore it appears that regulation of citizenship in a union republic does not in general contradict the all-union Constitution, but instead serves as a means of determining the very concept of citizenship in a union republic.

Published on 28 September, the draft law is democratic on the whole, and it contains rather detailed regulations governing recognition of citizenship, and its acquisition and loss. In comparison with the previously published draft it establishes a wider range of persons who will be

recognized as citizens of the republic following adoption of this law by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

However, in my opinion there are provisions which are not in keeping with the vital needs and interests of a significant number of persons—servicemen, their families and persons discharged into the reserves following active service in particular.

Thus, were the law to be adopted in the form in which it was published, a sizable number of servicemen (both compulsory-service personnel, as well as officers and warrant officers) will be deprived of citizenship in the republic. This group of persons will arise immediately after the law goes into effect. You see, those who joined the service following its adoption will not be citizens of the republic, while in accordance with Paragraph 3, Article 1 of the law those who were in the republic at the moment of its adoption will become citizens. This will naturally divide the military collectives. The law goes on to determine the procedure for adoption of citizenship and the terms of its acquisition—in particular knowing the language, taking an oath and so on. However, the features of military service are complex, and meeting these terms is rather problematic in the army: Russian is the principal language used in the armed forces, and military terminology is also in Russian. Moreover soldiers take the military oath, which obligates them to be dependable defenders of the entire USSR.

Nor should we forget that many servicemen serve active duty in different regions of the country, in different union republics, and military people simply do not have the capacity to study as many languages as there are republics and regions.

And so, a consequence of these norms of the law would be growth of the number of persons without Lithuanian SSR citizenship serving in the republic. And this in my opinion is a clearly undesirable process, inasmuch as in view of their position and the nature of their activities, such persons, who lack citizenship, are responsible for combat readiness, and weapons, expensive combat equipment created with the money of the peoples of the USSR, and great material valuables are entrusted to them.

It seems to me that this law should contain a norm pertaining directly to servicemen, and it should be worded as follows: "Persons undergoing active military service or discharged into the reserves or retired and remaining (arriving) for permanent residence in the republic, and who possess legal means of existence, are (or are recognized to be) citizens of the Lithuanian SSR." This norm would attest to true concern and attention toward servicemen fulfilling difficult and responsible duty.

The draft contains a number of other provisions that directly affect the interests of military service, and the rights and freedoms of citizens. Thus the draft's Article 20 determines the grounds for losing Lithuanian SSR citizenship. They may include "enlisting for service in

another state without the knowledge and permission of competent state organs of the Lithuanian SSR." But the concept "service" is not rendered specific. And it might be military, diplomatic or border service, service in the militia, and so on. Nor is it clear which organs should grant "permission" for enlistment into service, and who will "supervise" all of this. In view of all of the arising questions, these norms may be interpreted broadly, including to mean that those persons who serve in the USSR Armed Forces may be deprived of citizenship in the republic.

We certainly still have to account for the realities of today's international relations and the possibilities for development and renewal of the USSR as a federated state, since otherwise this provision would perhaps lead to a negative effect. And a negative effect hardly needs to be inevitable in this case. What we probably need to do here is consider both the qualitative and the quantitative state of the armed forces, since their maintenance requires colossal material outlays in any state, and this is something within the means of only large states possessing high economic, political and social potential.

25 Percent of Draftees to Serve in Home Republic

90UM0076C Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
19 Oct 89 p 4

[Interview with Lt Gen L. L. Sharashenidze, military commissar of the Georgian SSR, by V. Privalov: "Taking a Step Toward Conscripts"]

[Text] A typical call-up for service in the army usually means a lot of worry and troubles for conscripts, their parents and military commissariat workers, but this one is marked by a significant innovation benefiting the young people of our republic: The USSR Ministry of Defense published an order allowing 25 percent of Georgian conscripts to perform active military service within our republic. Lieutenant General L. L. Sharashenidze, military commissar of the Georgian SSR, comments on this order.

[Privalov] This 25 percent is a sizable number when we translate it into thousands of conscripts who now feel that they are receiving support from home, into specific human destinies. But the remaining 75 percent are still many thousands of young people who are entitled to ask: "But in order that no one would be insulted or displeased, couldn't we make it so that all conscripts from Georgia would perform military service inside the republic?" How realistic might such a prospect be?

[Sharashenidze] It would be impossible to allow the entire contingent of local conscripts to perform their service in Georgia. The fact is that a quarter of the personnel of military units are replaced with every call-up, and the numerical strength of troops in the republic is not so great as to be able to absorb all natives of Georgia.

[Privalov] Then who falls into this cherished 25 percent? Who will determine whether a conscript can serve near his home, and on the basis of what principles?

[Sharashenidze] The first priority in serving near one's home and one's family will be awarded to conscripts who are already married—around 600 youngsters of the present call-up, according to our data. In addition we could also provide an advantage to those thousand young people who had raised this issue earlier in Tbilisi, and who basically won the right to serve in Georgia. Moreover the conscripts we select for training as sergeants for subsequent service in a military unit will be the ones who have better facility with Russian. A good knowledge of Russian will also play its role in those military specialties requiring the ability to master military equipment of constantly growing complexity. There is of course a certain possibility for abuses on the part of military commissariat workers authorized to determine who among the conscripts is to serve inside the republic. However, the republic military commissariat is placing this matter under strict control, for which purpose a commission has been created under the chairmanship of Colonel V. G. Sulaberidze, chief of the political department of the republic's military commissariat; this commission will also include representatives of the public.

[Privalov] What wishes of the republic's people concerning military service do you feel would be acceptable in the immediate future?

[Sharashenidze] Many are troubled today by the *dedovshchina* problem in the army, and alarmed by the fact that youngsters are dying as a result of accidents. I am not about to assert that this is the result of malicious persecution of Georgian soldiers, but the fact itself that people are dying not during war but out of someone's carelessness, out of unconscientious fulfillment of one's obligations, is by itself disturbing, and requires persistent investigation in each specific case. And cases in which matters go as far as bloodshed at a personal level, in the course of conflicts between oldtimers and new recruits, are all the more criminal. Believe me that this is a very serious problem; much is being done now to solve it. Time will tell how things will go for youngsters serving in their own republic, though my personal opinion is that negative factors having an unfavorable effect on the combat readiness of soldiers also exist when the soldier's place of service is near his home. Such proximity cannot promote development of a courageous, tempered character.

Ministry of Defense Role in Housing Construction

90UM0076B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Oct 89 First Edition p 2

[Article: "So Who Is Supposed to Look Out for Reserve Officers?"]

[Text] On 18 July KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an article by Lieutenant Colonel N. Guk titled "On the Brink of Despair." It described how reserve and retired officers

in Ulyanovsk banded together into a society in order to jointly defend their rights to obtain living space.

Among the numerous responses to the newspaper's article, there was a letter to the editor from the Ulyanovsk City CPSU Committee. We feel that it deserves being reproduced here in its entirety, with only insignificant abbreviation.

"I attentively read N. Guk's article 'On the Brink of Despair,' and I would like to state my point of view on this issue.

"Yes, cases of violation of social justice in the distribution of housing space were established in the city. They were investigated, and the guilty received party and administrative punishment.

"The city executive committee's list of applicants for housing space now includes 155 families of retired officers and warrant officers. Would those few apartments that were assigned out of turn have solved their problems? Hardly. Though without a doubt there are no justifications for such violations from a moral point of view.

"The article's author examines the problem from one, in my opinion narrow, position of the military department: There is a decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers requiring that retired servicemen be provided housing with all of the conveniences within 3 months. If the decree exists, then satisfy it. If not, you're just a bunch of bureaucrats, and some other things besides.

"But there is another side to the issue, and it is here that the root of the problem rests. Did those who drafted this decree and those who voted for it think about how it would be implemented locally? Is the material base for this present? Given the economically unsubstantiated approach taken to this decree, it was predestined to failure. Thus it turns out that concern for people who had devoted their best years to the state's defense is nothing more than words.

"Let's look at the realities. According to the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree concerning this issue, the percentage of housing space reserved by enterprises and organizations for reserve officers is established by the executive committees of local soviets depending on the volume of housing construction carried on at the expense of centralized state investments. It is set at 5 percent in Ulyanovsk Oblast, and prior to 1986 no special problems ever arose, since most enterprises built housing at the expense of centralized state assets. But now labor collectives are validly asking why they should give their hard-earned money to someone else. The enterprise has already made its deduction into the budget, after all.

"In my opinion no department relates so uncaringly to its veterans as does the Ministry of Defense. A person has served his time, he has surrendered the housing

space he had previously, and now he's free. What happens to him after that, nobody cares. His arrival with his family in the city he has chosen for subsequent residency catches the city authorities unawares.

"In Ulyanovsk, the inflow of families of retiring servicemen increased in the last 5 years from 29 to 155. We have been informed that in connection with the reduction of the armed forces, another 100 families are expected to arrive in the city. But when they will arrive—that's still a mystery to us. The number of apartments which the city is in a position to allocate to officers and warrant officers is 116-120 annually. That's not much, I agree. But it would hardly be right to first provide for the retirees, and then distribute whatever is left over to those waiting in line in the local soviets. According to the letter of the law, this is in fact the way it is supposed to be. Incidentally, this is the means by which the committee of retired officers and reserve warrant officers is attempting to influence the city executive committee.

"So what does this mean? Is there no solution? There is one. In our opinion the sole proper solution would be for the Ministry of Defense to participate proportionately in construction of housing in each region (city) at the expense of centralized state assets allocated specially for these purposes by the USSR Gosplan.

"It seems to me that personal files on officers are maintained better in the army than anywhere else, and personnel workers know beforehand who is going to be retired, and when. Therefore they could plan ahead of time how much capital investments should be allocated to each region, and what the contracting volume would have to be. Couldn't we make such calculations once a year, and inform the city authorities, let us say 5 years in advance, concerning the forthcoming arrival of the family of a certain officer who has completed his tour of duty, so that his name could be added to the waiting list ahead of time? He would still be working, but he would know that his place in line is moving up.

"The Ministry of Defense is not troubling us with any counterproposals. I think that the issue of private construction of cottages within city limits or of private homes in rural areas for those who have some savings could be examined. I think that the capacities of military construction units could also be used to build housing for retirees in oblast and rayon centers.

"While I do not claim to have covered the subject completely, I can confidently state that the problem is solvable—all we need is to think out all of the means of its solution well. Any other approach would lead to unnecessary discord between city authorities and people who have earned a better fate than that which is offered them following their tour of duty.

"And in conclusion. I leave it to the author's conscience as to whether I really said the following words in N. Guk's article: '...if you intend to enter into confrontation with the city committee and the city executive committee, you'll not receive anything at all.'

"Yu. Kolpakov, first secretary of the Ulyanovsk CPSU Central Committee."

Because the letter voices reproaches against the USSR Ministry of Defense in regard to a number of positions, the editor asked Colonel D. Yarmak, deputy chief of the Main Billeting Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, to state his opinion on these issues.

"It is personally incomprehensible to me why Comrade Kolpakov assesses the position of armed forces veterans, the newspaper and even the USSR Ministry of Defense as narrowly departmental. After all, the procedure for allocating housing to reserve and retired officers is determined not by the military department but by a decree of the government and the CPSU Central Committee. It became effective not just yesterday but back in 1960. And the three-month time period within which housing space must be provided by local authorities is not someone's whim. It is based on the need for preserving continuity of work, the right to advantageous job placement, and the right to other advantages established by law.

"Unfortunately the position occupied in recent years by some executive committees of local soviets is hard to call objective and constructive. Rather than helping people find at least temporary housing and fill out registrations, they look at them as annoying petitioners coveting someone else's wealth. As a result almost 80 percent of officers discharged into the reserves or retired remain in apartments allocated on the basis of their last place of work, and tens of thousands of them live today in closed and isolated military posts, far away from population centers. Moreover this aggravates the housing problem for those who are still in uniform. Despite the fact that the volume of housing construction carried on by the Ministry of Defense is increasing from one year to the next, very many officers and warrant officers are forced to wander in search of their own 'nook.'

"As follows from the official letter to the editor, its author is not adverse to blaming his headache on a healthy head, reproaching the military department for an uncaring attitude toward veterans. But it is precisely the Ministry of Defense that has been fighting for changes in the unfavorable situation in this issue for a number of years. Thus in 1988 a number of proposals were submitted to the government directed at improving provision of housing to servicemen discharged into the reserves or retired. A corresponding decree was adopted by the USSR Council of Ministers on 7 September of this year.

"It orders the councils of ministers of the union republics to implement immediate measures in order to ensure that all officers, shore-based and seagoing warrant officers and extended-service servicemen on record in the executive committees of soviets of people's deputies at the moment of adoption of this decree receive housing in the course of this year and in the next year. Much of what Comrade Kolpakov wants is also foreseen.

Including allocation of the necessary capital investments, with the financing sources indicated. It has been determined that as of 1 April the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the USSR KGB and the chief of the railroad troops must communicate information to executive committees of local soviets by way of the military commissariats on the tentative number of servicemen to be discharged in the given region.

"Local government organs have been granted permission to allocate up to 5 percent additional housing space this year and in the following year in homes built at the expense of enterprises and organizations and transferred to them on a proportionate occupancy basis.

"In addition a number of decisions were adopted by the government at the suggestion of the Ministry of Defense to expand the possibilities of servicemen for joining residential construction and residential cooperatives or carrying on private housing construction in population centers selected for permanent residency prior to their discharge into the reserves or their retirement.

"As far as Comrade Kolpakov's proposal for using military construction units to build housing for retirees is concerned, the realities of the situation must be considered. In 1989-1990 the Ministry of Defense will in fact build around 7,500 apartments specifically for servicemen discharged into the reserves or retired in connection with reduction of the USSR Armed Forces.

"The Ministry of Defense agreed to this forced measure even though it is obvious that this was done to the detriment of providing housing space to servicemen still serving.

"I think that there is no need to prove that the possibilities of military construction organizations are not boundless. And Comrade Kolpakov should be aware of how much military builders are participating in the solution of the most important national economic problems. As their output capacities are freed, it would of course be a good thing to utilize military builders in housing construction. But this is a matter for the future.

"And one last thing. I must agree with the author of the letter that party and government decrees on the problems discussed here are divorced from real life, and therefore impossible to fulfill. I am certain that these decisions could be carried out if we distance ourselves from petty local and bureaucratic approaches. After all, concern for the motherland's defenders is our common concern."

FROM THE EDITOR: It seems to us that while the positions of both participants of the debate are outwardly divergent, they are nonetheless united in the conviction that the housing problem of servicemen discharged into the reserves or retired can be solved. Rather than passing this concern to someone else, we simply need to act vigorously, and seek ways to unravel the arising tangles of contradictions.

But the main obstacle on this road, as our readers validly emphasize, is the bureaucratism and bureaucratic indifference. "Besides all else," writes Major General of Aviation O. Inyushin, "establishment of the needed mutual understanding between local authorities and former servicemen is hindered by the fact that legislative documents take a long time to get down to the local level, sometimes half a year."

This unfortunately also pertains to the 7 September 1989 decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, which judging from the letters has not yet been received by many executive committees and military commissariats, and in places where it has been received, it is not being implemented. Such red tape is frustrating to the people, since it postpones resolution of even those issues which should be examined without delay. Take for example placing individuals on the apartment waiting list without their having to show a certificate indicating that they have surrendered their housing at their old place of residency. In this case we need to do everything we can to make sure that good decisions are implemented.

Lack of Official Reaction to Draft Resistance Noted

90UM0076A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Oct 89 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Lt Gen N. Ter-Grigoryants, deputy chief of General Staff of the Ground Forces, by Lt Col N. Burbyga: "Autumn Call-Up: Concerns and Anxieties"]

[Text]

[Burbyga] Norat Grigoryevich, what from your point of view are the unique features of the present call-up?

[Ter-Grigoryants] We have encountered situations that had not existed before. I am referring to the reluctance of many young people (let me emphasize that I'm not talking about isolated incidents) to fulfill their constitutional duty. This is especially typical of Baltic and Transcaucasian republics. For example just in Georgia alone, 1,500 persons failed to show up at induction centers and for transportation to the forces in spring of this year. And some announced a hunger strike as a sign of protest. Unfortunately such things are being observed now as well. Antidraft activities by representatives of various informal associations have become especially aggressive. Cases of this kind are known as well: On 17 October a group of persons arrived by bus in Tbilisi at the republic's induction station in order to disrupt the departure of the young complement for the army. Similar pictures could also be observed in these days near the induction stations in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

[Burbyga] Yes, these cases are unprecedented. But the country does have its constitution, and the USSR law "On Universal Compulsory Military Service" is in effect. What is the reaction to these occurrences by those who are called upon to stand guard over the law?

[Ter-Grigoryants] I would call the situation that has evolved paradoxical. The facts I've cited are no secret to anyone. The boycott of the call-up is being carried out before the eyes of soviet, party and law enforcement organs. But for some reason they are all remaining silent, or they are creating the appearance that nothing is happening. For example conscripts were locked inside the military commissariat building in Armenia's Idzhnevanskiy Rayon, and were not allowed to go to the induction station. And what do you think? No one implemented the appropriate measures. Or consider this: The first call-up into the armed forces in Azerbaijan was recently disrupted. And this involved close to a thousand people. And everyone is silent, as if their mouths are sealed shut. In the meantime those who profit from this are celebrating. We won! But what? It's their own army they dealt a blow to. You might say we've raised a generation of deserters. And in the meantime there is no reaction from the appropriate organs. Here's an example, furthermore. When help was asked of N. Mgeliashvili, first secretary of the Tifliski Rayon Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, his answer was this: "I'm like the people. And the people don't want to serve."

This position of noninterference taken by soviet, party and law enforcement organs led to a situation where military commissariats now have to face all of these difficulties on their own. And this carries the danger of conflicts between military commissariat workers and those who do not desire to serve. Dangerous symptoms already exist. Recently in Yerevan an attack was made on the republic's military commissar, Major General A. Arutyunyan. An infuriated mob beat him for over 20 minutes. He was a lucky not to have been killed.

[Burbyga] Various demands to change the procedures of serving in the armed forces are now being stated in a number of republics.

[Ter-Grigoryants] Such demands are in fact being stated. But after all, we need to look at things realistically. Judge for yourself. Today we have unified, multiethnic armed forces that are manned on the basis of the extraterritorial principle. Military units and subunits are stationed in different regions of the country on the basis of their operational purpose and with regard for reasonable necessity of maintaining our state's defense. As far as the idea of serving only within the territory of one's republic is concerned, it is technically impossible.

[Burbyga] But what would you say in regard to national formations?

[Ter-Grigoryants] In my opinion this would not lead to anything good. The armed forces would be torn up into pieces. Would having two national divisions really serve any useful purpose? That's first. But I envision something else here as well. The confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan is still going on. It is being waged for the moment with stolen weapons. But if

national divisions are created, what would happen? Would we see another Lebanon?

[Burbyga] Norat Grigoryevich, I have heard that things are not going all that smoothly with the call-up of reservists for various training sessions.

[Ter-Grigoryants] There are problems here as well. According to the law, we can call up reservists for training sessions only for 3 months. And not more. Every reservist knows this. He also knows that bringing in harvests and carrying out various tasks in behalf of the national economy do not count as training sessions. It is not our doing, of course, that training sessions are used as the excuse for calling reservists up to carry out tasks in behalf of the national economy. This is done in response to orders from above. But such documents are not made public. Friction arises between the military commissariats and the reservists and enterprise directors who, citing the law, say that such work is not foreseen by it. And they're right in their own way. Overall, there are many inconsistencies. For example the USSR laws "On the State Enterprise (Association)" and "On Cooperation in the USSR" do not foresee creation of funds by enterprises, institutions and organizations to cover expenses associated with fulfillment of the USSR law "On Universal Compulsory Military Service" by citizens, and thus they act contrary to it.

In order to put things in order, I think it would be suitable to examine the issue of call-ups and active military service soon, without delay, at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. We obviously need to conduct call-ups into the USSR Armed Forces not by an order of the minister of defense but by a special decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Azerbaijani 'Informals' Encourage Draftees To Go AWOL

90UM0096A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in
Russian 29 Oct 89 p 2

[Unattributed report: "In the Military Commissariat of the Azerbaijan SSR"]

[Text] The incidents of unsanctioned mass meetings under the leadership of informal associations and groups have become more frequent recently at conscription centers of the republic's regional (municipal) military commissariats. Using the process of democratization for their own unsavory purposes, they put obstacles to the way of the regular conscription of youth for active duty and spread various rumors and insinuations that are completely groundless. We know of cases where the leaders of the informals demanded that parents of soldiers serving outside the borders of Azerbaijan write letters to their sons calling on them to go AWOL from their units. Here they give assurances that such criminal steps will go unpunished.

Persons who dodge the next draft, as well as those hindering the timely reporting of civilians at collection

points or conscription centers will be subject to criminal prosecution. Materials regarding illegal actions are sent to law-enforcement organs.

The military commissariat calls on workers and youth of the republic to give a decisive rebuff to any illegal actions aimed at interfering with the conscription of young men to active military service, or their accomplishment of their constitutional duty.

The military commissariat of the Azerbaijan SSR informs the conscripts and their parents that in accordance with the current legislation the Soviet Armed Forces is manned extraterritorially; 25 percent of the total number of the draft contingent will serve in the republic.

Opinions on Creation of Minority Military Formations

90UM0098A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
31 Oct 89 p 4

[Round table discussion sponsored by the editors of PRAVDA UKRAINY and LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA (Red Banner Kiev Military District), conducted by PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent Ye. Guzhva and Lt Col V. Nikitenko: "Serve in 'National Billets'"]

[Text] The words in the heading have been heard more than once at various meetings. In his speech at the September plenum of the CPSU Central Committee Army Gen D. Yazov, USSR Minister of Defense, made the following statement:

"Appeals have been heard more and more openly of late for us to billet our army according to ethnic origin, as well as ultimatums that we establish ethnic military formations in the military service made up exclusively of members of the indigenous populations within the territories of their republics. They have been advanced by leaders of the people's fronts of Latvia, Estonia and Georgia, the Lithuanian Sajudis and a number of other movements."

So just what should the contemporary army be like? How should inter-ethnic relations be organized in the military collectives? How can we improve the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth? The following extended-duty military personnel in the Red Banner Kiev Military District expressed their personal opinions on these and other matters: Sgt Araik Galstyan, Armenian; Pvt Yuriy Belyayev, Russian; Pvt Aleksandr Bagrov, Ukrainian; Privs Aleksandr Yankunas and Gedeminas Kvayauskas, Lithuanians; Pvt Oskar Vayvod, Latvian. They were joined by Pvt (reserve) Oleg Chernyuk, Ukrainian and student at Kiev State University; Col A.A. Divanyan, Armenian and instructor at the Kiev Higher Radio Electronic Engineering Air Defense School; Lt Col A.N. Romanik, Ukrainian, deputy chief of the political section of the Kiev State Military Commissariat and veteran of the combat operations in Afghanistan.

Whom Does it Benefit?

The idea of performing one's military service in ethnic billets might be attractive at first glance. If it is implemented the soldiers will be able to see their families and friends whenever they wish, for example. It will not be necessary to spend enormous sums on transportation for draftees and those who have already served out their term. And then serving in "one's own nest" would not prevent the development of love for one's native land, on which one lives and which one is also guarding—more reliably, it would seem. In addition, it would be possible to restore the national officer corps as provided for in the programs of the people's fronts in certain republics.

"The idea might truly seem tempting," Pvt O. Vayvod said, opening the discussion. "It only seems that way, however. In fact, those who have served and who are presently in the service are convinced that the further one's military unit is from home, the better it is for the individual. When the parents are nearby, it is not the service, believe me. All one's thoughts are there, at home, and not on the training exercise or alert duty."

"All we need is for the military service to become an ordinary job: go to work in the morning and return in the evening," Sgt A. Galstyan said in support of O. Vayvod. "In the army you do everything yourself. You endure the difficulties and the adversities yourself. You test your strength and become accustomed to living on your own. It is in the army where one matures and becomes a real man and soldier, gets to know true friendship, military and manly."

The other people present entered the discussion. It became clear that where one serves is far from the most important thing to those who strive to fulfill their military duty conscientiously and honorably. This attitude was accurately expressed by Pvt G. Kvayauskas:

"A soldier should be there where he is most needed. The question of the fellows' serving within the parental fold can simply not be taken seriously. It does not even make sense. This is the dream of those who try either to evade the military service or simply to get their service out of the way, to be sure. Those soldiers who cling to mama's apron strings are not worth much."

"Everything you say is true, fellows," student Oleg Chernyuk agreed. "It is not quite so simple, though. While I was still in the army, serving in Azerbaijan, I read in the magazine POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE that a meeting of the Globus City Association in Vilnius proposed the establishment of a volunteer army in Latvia, one which would have no weapons. That seems strange—and suspicious: an army without weapons, even though it would have its own 'commander in chief' and its own 'generals.' But why would we need such an army when units of our Soviet Army, including Lithuanian servicemen, are located there in Latvia?"

A. Yankunas and G. Kvayauskas shrugged their shoulders, indicating that they too could not understand it. They are well aware of the significance of the growing independence and the establishment of republic economic self-sufficiency. Just why would such an army be formed? Only for the possibility that Lithuania would separate from the Soviet Union....

"I believe that such notions are planted among us by enemies of the restructuring. They want to weaken our nation, to create antagonism between ethnic groups to destroy our unity and solidarity and to undermine our patriotic and international feelings," was the opinion expressed by Pvt A. Bagrov.

"Since the demand is being made that the army be distributed among ethnic billets," Pvt Yu. Belyayev expressed the thought, "then let us break the military subunits down by oblast, rayon.... We can go all the way down to the village. 'This is my village, this is my home.' I live here and I shall serve here—at my mother's hearth. You see how far we can go if we think this way.

"No, this will never be! Our army is the people's army and we have vowed to defend our people, to serve the beloved homeland with devotion and honor."

How Will It Turn Out?...

Continuing the discussion of the need for an army organized on an ethnic basis, the participants touched upon several different levels: how it would affect state interests and the nation's combat readiness, whether such a move was materially feasible, whether inter-ethnic relations would be strengthened. The thoroughgoing discussion made it possible to view the problem from various perspectives.

"I would like to enliven our discussion a little," Col A.A. Divanyan said. "We recall that in the '20s and '30s our nation had purely ethnic formations. Not just the well-known Latvian riflemen but also Armenian and Georgian divisions. I would like to know, if this was possible then, why is it not feasible today?"

"In my opinion, national armies are a good thing," Pvt A. Yankunas replied. "But under one condition: that their objectives coincide with the interests of our nation's entire people. Back then a struggle was underway to reinforce Soviet power, to consolidate the gains of Great October. Today, however, we have the Soviet Army, which demonstrated its strength and power in the battle with fascism. Members of all ethnic groups of the Soviet Union serve in our army. Our nation is enormous. If we allowed every ethnic group to have its own army, what would the small nations and ethnic groups do? Who would serve in the north, in Chukotka or in the Far East, for example, where, as we know, the population density is very low?"

"The residents themselves, including women, would have to be enlisted. And there would still not be enough people. Furthermore, someone has to work," concluded

Pvt A. Bagrov. "Take the Ukraine and Belorussia. If all of the young men were to serve in their own republics, there would be a great many soldiers there. And there would be no one to serve in other regions of the nation. It is wrong to think only of one's own republic, of one's own nation. We need to defend our entire socialist homeland."

"There is no single republic today in which only the indigenous ethnic group lives. And the groups have mixed, so to speak. My dad is a Latvian, for example, my mother a Ukrainian. And there are many such families. If our republic has its own army, why should I protect just one of them?" was the thought expressed by Pvt O. Vayvod.

"I agree with both Aleksandrs and with Oskar," Pvt Yu. Belyayev interjected. "Many different ethnic groups do indeed now reside in the republics. How can one defend just 'his own'? What about the people of other ethnic origins, one's comrades, friends and neighbors? How is our inter-ethnic friendship and mutual assistance to be practiced. We need always to bear this in mind."

"I am not at all sorry that I serve in the Ukraine," Sgt A. Galstyan said, continuing the discussion. "Naturally, any soldier wants to be close to home. He cannot forget the homeland's interests, however, cannot replace them with the interests of 'ethnic billets.' I do not want these to seem like just high-sounding words, but we do indeed receive schooling in internationalism and learn from one another in the army. I shall always recall with warmth Pvts Dzhaginyan and Kazaryan, who helped me learn Russian. They had been helped by others. There is no ethnic distinction in the army. There are good soldiers and poor ones.

"This is what alarms me, however. Every day we learn from newspapers, from radio and television about encounters between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Take the reports out of Nagornyy Karabakh, which increasingly resemble war reports. The ignorant ire of mutual dislike blinds those involved in the conflicts, overwhelms their intellect. A bridge was blown up on the outskirts of Stepanakert, cutting off the road not just to the center of the city of Shusha but also to two rayons with Armenian populations. An inspection of a truck arriving from the city of Goris in the settlement of Gadrut turned up an entire arsenal of ammunition: grenades, explosives, detonators, Bickford safety fuses, rifled and hunting weapons, powder and even the parts for an anti-aircraft gun.

"I cannot listen to such news calmly. Even more alarming, however, is the thought of what could occur if each republic had its own ethnic formations. It is not hard to imagine."

Pvts Yu. Belyayev, G. Kvayauskas and A. Bagrov expressed the opinion that only militarily incompetent people who know about the army only by hearsay and who are obviously pursuing mercenary interests could be enlisted for forming such an army.

"All of your comments have been very much to the point. If the demand for the establishment of an ethnic army and restoration of the ethnic officer corps is indeed the first step toward separation from the Soviet Union, then it is clear what this will lead to," Col A.A. Divanyan said in summation. "We can see where the roots lead. But let us calculate whether the republics are capable of maintaining their own armed forces at the level essential today to ensure the defense capability."

"It is unlikely that any of the initiators thought about the material aspect of the matter," Lt Col A. Romanik entered the discussion to say. "One does not have to be much of an economist to understand that this would be very, very expensive. Each republic would have to build its own defense industry. And where would the cadres of ethnic specialists come from? Many republics would have to open military schools for pilots, missilemen, tankmen, artillerymen and so forth. They would have to build firing ranges and training centers. And what would be the fate of the Navy? Could it too be spread among national billets? I therefore share the alarm and apprehensions which the minister of defense expressed at the CPSU CC plenum. It would be so easy to turn a powerful army into numerous 'local armies' incapable of withstanding a powerful enemy. History contains many examples of this. Remember the events described in 'The Lay of Igor's Host.' And would certain republics, as already mentioned, be able to support 'their' army at the contemporary level of development? What functions would these armies perform?"

Aleksandr Nikolayevich put forth some convincing conclusions. He was supported by all the round table participants. They were unanimous in their opinion that our nations need an inter-ethnic, qualitatively prepared, modern army capable of carrying out the missions involved in the defense doctrine, the foundation of our military organizational development.

We Are Not Occupiers But Defenders

It is not surprising that this subject would come up in the discussion. More and more frequently the press is reporting on extremists' appeals by certain leaders of Sajudis: "Occupiers, get out of Latvia!" Similar voices are sometimes heard also from the Transcaucasus. We were therefore interested in how the round table participants regarded such statements.

"Only a person of limited understanding would talk that way," Col A. Divanyan felt. "just think about it. What would have happened had the Red Army not entered the Baltic area in 1940? Fascist forces would inevitably have invaded the area. This is borne out also by historical facts. Several thousand German henchmen were neutralized there on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. And if the Barbarossa Plan had been carried out, would those Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians have remained independent? Of course not. Talk about occupation invariably evokes alarm and forces one to think about 'whom this benefits.'"

"Occupiers do not greet people with a salute, as we were greeted in 1940...." These words from a letter written by a veteran of the front were recalled by Pvt (reserve) Chernyuk with reference to those events.

"The youth want to know the historical truth, of course, and particularly the truth about the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. It is simply foolish to pin labels on the Soviet Army, however.

"There is another side to the matter, to be sure. Our soldiers who served in the Baltic and the Transcaucasus republics frequently know neither the traditions nor the customs of those peoples and make no effort to learn them. The officers themselves do not always work on this. This was the case in our subunit at any rate. What kind of spiritual kinship with the local population can there be in such a situation?"

"To tell the truth, some soldiers in our company do not even have a knowledge of the precise borders of the Union republics," Pvt O. Vayvod said, sharing his feelings. "For them the Baltic area is foreign territory. This is disputably not good. I do not share the statements about occupation, however. Just prior to this discussion I called home, to Riga. My mother is alarmed at what is happening. My father, a serviceman who traveled throughout the nation, is also anxious. Is he too an occupier in his homeland? Just what am I to the Ukraine in that case? I spoke with fellows from the brigade. Before entering the army I worked at the VEF plant. The people there do not like any of this. It has reached the point that the Russian-language population is beginning to leave the republic. Will this make our friendship stronger?"

Pvt O. Vayvod spoke out in support of Lt Col A. Romanik. There are many Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians serving in Red Army units in the Baltic republics, he said. How does the indigenous population regard them? Also as occupiers? Aleksandr Nikolayevich told about a recent trip to Tbilisi. There too some people are disseminating such appeals. But not for free. A printed "proclamation" goes for 1 ruble. The demand is not great. And such a "disseminator" stands around on Shota Rustaveli Street from morning to evening, hoping that someone will take the bait.

"These people give absolutely no thought to the great responsibility which the army bears today," Lt Col A. Romanik continued. "It involves primarily defending their peaceful labor. I am confident that such discussions are not engaged in by those who saw how our soldiers worked to save the people following the earthquake in Armenia. No one asked about their nationality. The disaster united everyone."

"And was it not the same at Chernobyl?" Sgt A. Galstyan asked, continuing the discussion. "We worked 3 months there, decontaminating buildings. The soldiers did not spare themselves. Including Russian Pvt Borisov, Uzbek Pvt Khadzhiyev and Turkmen Pvt Samekhov. They understood that they were fulfilling their duty as

defenders of the homeland in peacetime. I cannot believe that anyone could have brought himself to call them occupiers. I feel that anyone who talks this way about Soviet soldiers is a real provocateur and should bear criminal liability."

Pvt A. Bagrov's opinion was unequivocal:

"We are certainly not occupiers but defenders of our socialist nation. We serve where the homeland orders us to serve. Every serious person understands this. And I would remind anyone who calls me an 'occupier' that it was precisely our Soviet Army which brought liberation from fascism not just to the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic republics, but also to the European states, and helped many nations and ethnic groups to survive. To forget this is to betray the memory of our fallen grandfathers, to belittle the importance of the Great Victory whose 45th anniversary we are preparing to celebrate soon."

We showed Lt Gen P.A. Sharygin, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Kiev Military District, the text of the round table discussion.

We gave him an opportunity to comment:

I believe that the subject chosen for the discussion is very important today. Inter-ethnic relations have been exacerbated in our nation today as never before, particularly in the Transcaucasus and Baltic republics. The people's fronts and public movements which have come about there are advancing their concepts and actively seeking supporters.

Nor have these processes bypassed the Ukraine. Here too there are many unofficial associations persistently promoting their point of view on internal reforms in the republic. This has to do, among other things, with questions of military organizational development. I can therefore understand the concern of the round table participants when they speak of the need to form an army exclusively on an inter-ethnic basis. I share that opinion. I would add only that one must not forget the extra-territorial and cadre principles. These principles are supported also by the Congress of Peoples' Deputies.

As a participant in the CPSU CC plenum, I want to say that this issue received the most serious of attention there. And understandably so. The party has always demonstrated concern for the defense of our multinational state and for its army. In response to the proponents of "national formations," I want to cite V.I. Lenin's words stressing the importance of uniting all military forces into the powerful, international Red Army. "Not a single Soviet republic taken separately," he said, "can consider itself secure against economic attrition and military destruction." These words are still valid today.

Lt Col A. Romanik and Pvt O. Vayvod are therefore absolutely correct when they say that re-forming the

army would seriously undermine its combat readiness, destroy to some degree the international unity of our peoples and draw the republics into unjustified military outlays.

The very idea of having such formations is itself doubtful. Today, as we know, almost 60 million people live in republics other than "their own." I cannot help sharing also Sgt A. Galstyan's concern that in a critical situation, should inter-ethnic conflicts become exacerbated, "national armies" could be drawn into those conflicts. It is not difficult to guess what this could lead to.

I also want to point out the following fact, which, incidentally, was also stressed at the plenum. Internationalization of the life and activities of the armed forces of the military-political bloc facing us increases their strength. People there understand this well and are doing everything possible to strengthen it. Consciously or unconsciously, some people are proposing a different route for us, however. No, we shall not take that route.

The army has many problems today. We know that the processes occurring in the society are reflected also in the military collectives. Cases of national egotism, cliquishness and grouping by ethnicity have begun to manifest themselves more markedly in the military district. The so-called "ethnic fellowships" are sometimes a negative thing. The evasion of military service by certain draftees cannot but evoke justified indignation.

All of this shows that we have many shortcomings in our ideological-indoctrinational and military-patriotic work. District commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations are focusing their efforts on eliminating these and on uniting the multi-ethnic military collectives. However, we need to devote more attention also to strengthening ties with local party and soviet organs for purposes of improving the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth. The future soldier is going to perform his duty in a multi-ethnic collective, after all. Unfortunately, the round table participants said little about this aspect of the matter. It seems to me that all of these problems are closely interlinked. Our army is a product of its people, after all. And it is acutely disturbed by everything occurring in the nation.

I have to mention in this connection also the problem of the language of international communication, which the Russian language is. A knowledge of it is absolutely essential in an army armed with the most modern team-operated weapons. In the first place, the combat cohesion of the subunits depends upon this. It has to be said, however, that a number of republics have relaxed their efforts to teach draftees the Russian language. Last year alone, we know that there were 125,000 young soldiers in the army who knew practically no Russian. This is 12 times the number 20 years ago. We can therefore not keep silent about this problem, cannot remain indifferent to it. For more than a single year now groups for the study of the Russian language have

functioned in the Kiev Military District, and a sort of sponsorship of those with a poor knowledge of Russian has been established there. I understand that this kind of sponsorship helped Sgt A. Galstyan, a participant in the round table discussion, to fit into the collective more rapidly.

I am focusing attention on this matter for a reason. A study has shown that a lack of knowledge of the language frequently indicates a narrow outlook and an absence of useful interests in a draftee. This in turn evokes ridicule and humiliating jokes. This is perhaps why a certain portion of the youth are expressing a desire to serve in ethnic military formations. It is our job to prevent the development of such sentiments, to help the young soldiers settle into the new environment as rapidly as possible and develop them into real defenders of our multi-ethnic homeland.

The round table discussion arranged by the two editorial boards will certainly contribute in some measure to this.

Army Gen Popov on Multi-Ethnic Structure of the Armed Forces

90UM0141B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIIY in
Russian 5 Nov 89 p 3

[Interview with Army General N. I. Popov, USSR people's deputy, with Azerinform correspondent A. Guseynov: "An Army of a Multi-Ethnic People"]

[Text]

[Guseynov] Nikolay Ivanovich, the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference came to the conclusion that the military-political situation has become somewhat stabilized in the world, and that the level of the military danger has decreased. I would like to hear your opinion concerning the restructuring which is now occurring in the army in connection with this conclusion.

[Popov] Our state's foreign policy activities have acquired new vigor as a result of the new political thinking developed by the CPSU. Contacts at the highest level have grown more frequent, including in the military. A number of highly important treaties have been signed, and agreements to reduce strategic offensive arms and destroy chemical weapons are actively being worked on. Moreover the Soviet Union has adopted a number of highly important decisions on a unilateral basis: to reduce military expenditures by 10 billion rubles and the personnel strength of the USSR Armed Forces by 500,000, and to withdraw a number of units and formations from several states allied with us by 1990-1991. Soviet military science is undergoing significant restructuring, and the theory of military art and the programs of military educational institutions are being reworked. The personnel are undergoing training and indoctrination in keeping with modern military requirements, and the task of converting military production has attained a practical plane.

All of this attests to active introduction of defensive doctrine, to realization of the principle of reasonable sufficiency, to reorientation onto qualitative parameters, and to deepening restructuring in the troops. But we cannot forget about another conclusion of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference either: The tendencies toward disarmament and exclusion of the threat of military force have not acquired a sufficiently deep and irreversible nature. Evidence of this can be found in the presence of powerful groupings of strategic offensive arms of the USA and its allies, their high combat readiness, and attempts to upset, by modernizing armament, the strategic parity created by the efforts of the Soviet people.

As a USSR people's deputy I am constantly reminded of this by my constituents, and in precisely the same way I am reminded of our problems, including the low salary of officers and warrant officers, the difficult housing conditions in a number of garrisons, the problems of social, cultural and personal services, the infamous "dedovshchina" etc. We are doubtlessly working on these problems. Nonetheless for the sake of justice I should note that some of them are being solved with great difficulty. Thus in particular, there are many pacifists and nationalistically predisposed people among recent young army conscripts. Movements in support of creating national armies and of a transition to professional armed forces have recently arisen in our region, and not only in ours. In addition to this, various rumors and fabrications are being spread. I am certain in this connection that the time has come for open dialogue between the most varied movements and official organs. He who refuses to engage in dialogue, to find common ground, is deliberately opting for confrontation, for destruction of our foundations, and ultimately for undermining our unity.

I personally offer full support to the conclusion formulated in the CPSU platform, "The Party's Nationalities Policy in Modern Conditions," that manpower acquisition by the Soviet Armed Forces must continue on an international basis and in accordance with the extraterritorial principle. Otherwise, who for example would serve aboard submarines and in the country's remote regions? In a word, we need to display sufficient maturity in this aspect, and the understanding that reduction of the combat readiness and fighting capability of the USSR Armed Forces would be simply impermissible in today's conditions. It is toward increasing the former that restructuring the troops is proceeding.

[Guseynov] In this connection I would like to hear your opinion as to how the inter-ethnic situation in the country is affecting perestroika in the army.

[Popov] It is true that there is considerable discussion today about the fact that inter-ethnic conflicts in different regions of the country have had an influence on the army as well. It would be wrong to assert that this phenomenon does not exist. Soldiers of up to 10-15 nationalities often serve in a modern company for

example. This fact alone attests to the possibility for certain conflicts on ethnic grounds. Our commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations have foreseen the possibility of such development of events in the subunits and units, and they have instituted the principles of equal distribution of conscript youth of different nationalities. Today's crews, squads and teams are manned by soldiers of different nationalities. This is a time for mastering modern combat equipment, and not for debates!

A complex of measures of inter-ethnic education of the personnel have been developed in the course of perestroika. Commissions and groups on inter-ethnic relations are working everywhere. Russian language courses have been established in the units. Working independently or in organized fashion, many officers are studying the language, history, morals, traditions and customs of the peoples on whose territory their units are stationed.

Summarizing, it may be said that the entire system of personnel training and reeducation is being restructured in the interests of strengthening the friendship and brotherhood of soldiers of different nationalities.

Therefore I feel that it is quite proper that a group of Azerinform and republic television journalists toured two military districts with the purpose of preparing articles on how soldiers called up from Azerbaijan are serving. At the same time I think it would also be proper to use the mass media in the course of this year's call-up campaign to give the details as to what sort of people will remain within the republic to serve their tour.

These must be young people caring for elderly parents, people who have already begun families, and those who are fit only for noncombatant duty.

It is especially important to demonstrate how friendship and troop comradeship help soldiers in their service. In any case I am certain that no matter what nationality servicemen might be, army friendship will leave a mark on all of their subsequent life. That is what is important.

[Guseynov] How would you, as a USSR people's deputy, approach the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh? What do you see as the key to its solution?

[Popov] Emotions have been heated to the boiling point. The situation may take the most unexpected turns. And who among us does not experience bitterness when plunder and violence are occurring somewhere, when winter is beginning and numerous refugees have no housing, and when nationalistic sentiments are being openly expressed, especially among the young?

I am firmly certain that the conflict, the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh, must be solved calmly, prudently, with regard for historical development and for today's realities. I feel that this problem must be solved on the basis of the requirements of the USSR and Azerbaijan SSR constitutions.

Lt Gen Tabak on Civil-Military Relations

90UM0096B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 45, 8 Nov 89 p 11

[Excerpt from article by Lt Gen Aleksandr Tabak. "Honor of the Uniform, Honor of the Army"]

[Excerpt] Recently in the pages of our periodical press and in the other mass media one has observed a quite understandable explosion of interest in the life and activity of our Armed Forces. There is nothing reprehensible about this: we finally see the opening of the gates of top-secret military installations and the doors of the soldiers' barracks. Even the General Staff is gradually opening its repositories and publicizing information that even in the General Staff was previously known only to a few.

But in this case I have something else in mind. On the wave of glasnost, a storm of criticism has descended on the army from home-grown strategists, who assume that all they have to do is buy a ticket to the stadium to get the right to judge everything categorically, as happens on the soccer field. As, by the way, they discuss the problem of whether the army should remain with its former principles of universal military obligation, or whether a variant of volunteerism should be adopted. But we have learned something, namely how to count. What "variant of volunteerism" can this be, if it will cost us several times more than the current system? This is even with very modest pay for service members. For what can we use, if not pay and social benefits, to convince the potential volunteer today that it makes sense to leave his plant, institute, or cooperative, to trade his well-appointed apartment for a barracks in the Chukotka region?

Nor can I accept the current rebuke of the Army that there are "regiments of colonels without regiments, and at least battalions of generals without armies". The fact that every morning ranks of officers of military departments crowd certain Moscow streets means nothing at all. They work to manage the enormous Army mechanism.

At the same time, it cannot be denied that the percentage ratio of officers and conscript service members here is clearly in favor of the former. But you should also remember that weapons and war-waging methods are becoming more complicated. At the same time, undoubtedly, opportunities to cut many general and officer slots and reduce the level of certain organic categories have still not been exhausted.

Thus what perestroika does the Army require? How should it start? What paths should it follow?

Whatever we might say, there has been and remains a virgin land that every year demands tens and hundreds of soldiers and vehicles in the full heat of combat training. They are "pulled out" of their Army collectives and sent for long periods to various areas, where they

only sleep and eat according to military regulations, while the rest of the time they are under way and left to themselves.

There was the "construction project of the century"—the Baykal-Amur line, whose construction was first announced to the world by Brezhnev at Alma-Ata during a magnificent celebration of the 20th anniversary of the start of the conquest of the virgin land. Following Brezhnev to the rostrum came the first Secretary of the CC, VLKSM of that time, Ye. M. Tyazhelnikov and to stormy applause (there was no shortage of that at the time) he announced that the komsomol was sponsoring the construction project of the century and there was no doubt that tens and hundreds of thousands of komsomol volunteers would go there at the behest of their hearts. However the volunteer ardor quickly cooled in the Siberian chill. So the Army built the greater part of the BAM and never groaned or complained of difficulties.

Hence in general it is appropriate to ask the question here: what happened to the slogan of "komsomol sponsorship of the Army and Navy" that bored everyone so? Was this perhaps the only result, that the instructors of the komsomol regional committees hastened to collection centers of the military commissariats, hastily filling out komsomol membership cards and handing them to naked draftees?

We cannot discount the tragedy of Chernobyl, which also became a difficult test for the Army and for all our people. But the soldiers and officers went, not in the baggage train, but in the vanguard.

Is it high time to answer honestly: in what cases has the Army not justified the hopes of our people?

Can the Army itself be guilty because it is excessively loaded down by various state assignments and economic work? I can testify to the persistence shown at one time by the leadership of Azerbaijan to obtain its daily allocation of 2.5-3 thousand service members for the construction of the Baku metro, whose activation was timed to coincide with the anniversary of the republic's formation, and the difficulties experienced then by Marshal A. A. Grechko to repulse this solicitation. But you know, it was not always possible to repel zealous local leaders, who had grown used to seeing the military garrisons as an unpaid work force!

The process of perestroika urgently dictates the need for more precise definition of the role and functions of the Army in our state. The question of adopting laws on national defense and the Armed Forces has now come to a head.

It seems to me that the external function, aimed at the defense of the Soviet state and its allies from possible aggression, should become the most important and definitive for our Armed Forces. From the standpoint of internal conditions, the country does not need an Army. At the same time, this certainly does not mean that

military units cannot have any internal functions. But they should be clearly designated.

Without a doubt, the Army as a part of our society, flesh of the people's flesh, cannot stand aloof from emergencies, natural calamities, and other upheavals. But we should not make this the rule, raise it to the level of law, and teach our bad managers to patch up their shortcomings with the Army's help, to rescue the plan. But at present military units are very often called on to unload rail cars with fast-spoiling vegetables, to participate in sports spectacles and celebrations, to clean and repair streets, and to construct housing. Alas, in addition to this, some officials are not even averse to using soldiers to maintain their dachas, build garages, and repair personal automobiles. A stop should be put to this.

The system of the USSR's civil defense also demands qualified revision. The opinion exists that its functions more fully belong to organs involved in the internal affairs in the country, and it is hard not to agree with this. It would be correct to remove the construction and road-building units from the Armed Forces, as was done with respect to the internal troops. You see, the military builders, let's face facts, are far from being a real Army and cannot be counted as combat-ready units.

Or take the formation of plans to develop arms and military equipment. The actual needs of the troops are often not their starting point, but whatever is forced on them by the USSR GOSPLAN, which is basically oriented to the conveyor, to what is being serially produced by the defense industry. As a result there is an inevitable process of gradual accumulation of obsolete models, and new and more up-to-date military resources make their way only with the greatest difficulty.

It appears that some officers in the highest leadership of the Defense Ministry have become reconciled to this situation. As a past participant in many meetings of the command staff, probably not once have I heard a reasoned report on the financial status of the Armed Forces, on the cost picture of even key arms programs, or the actual expenses for the conduct of particular major exercises and maneuvers.

The necessity has also grown for a law protecting the rights and dignity of all categories of service members from insults, abasement, and the arbitrary rule of senior officers. Then it will be easier to handle "hazing" and other evils.

And of course, we should reexamine the situation whereby the Army has been transformed into a correctional institution. Today, very often, young soldiers and seamen come to the military units with one, even two convictions under their belt, we get draftees who for medical reasons are incapable of remembering the simplest formulas or bearing basic physical stresses. While the former corrupt the collectives with their thieves' experience, the latter simply become ballast for the Army, and bring it little benefit.

Let us be honest to the end and try to understand how the Army appears in publications of recent years. First of all, this is a soul-less machine, grinding up the fates of young people. It is an assemblage of high-handed types in fur hats, whose lack of culture is apparent and absolute. It is continuous harassment of soldiers, it is voicelessness, the barracks, a half-starved existence, and such. Let us be fair, for the issue is our Soviet Army. Is it as sullied as it is pictured?

Not without justification have we set about rethinking certain temporarily distorted pages of the Great Patriotic War, and we have reached the point where honored war and labor veterans have begun to avoid publicly wearing their combat decorations, sanctified in blood.

We have held businesslike and undoubtedly long overdue talks on democratization in the Army, and have fallen into the dubious quagmire of verbiage about the worthlessness of the Armed Forces and the ephemeral quality of defense of the socialist Fatherland; we are more and more infected with pacifism and cynically trample on respect for Army service. You see, these are by no means equivalent things—to fight for peace, but in the process forget the defense of the Motherland.

Ineffectiveness of Lower Military-Party Organs

90UM0098D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in
Russian 11 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Maj O. Vigovskiy, Western Group of Forces, under the rubric "The Problem—Collective Advice: The Rubric Mailbag": "Holding Oneself Accountable"]

[Text] **The society, which is undergoing a renewal, needs a renewed party which operates in accordance with the restructuring processes in the nation and the Armed Forces and which successfully performs the role of the political vanguard.**

The readers of the newspaper express their thoughts about this and hold collective counsel in the latest selection of letters under "The Party and the Restructuring."

The incident occurred at the end of the party meeting, during the discussion of the draft resolution. Sr Lt V. Martynov, platoon commander, refused to vote.

"What is this, a protest?" Sr Lt V. Taran, secretary of our battalion's party bureau, asked with surprise.

Martynov's answer was that during his 2 years as a member of the party organization he had become convinced that all resolutions are passed pro forma....

One could criticize the way he acted, but Martynov was right about the main thing. Little has changed in the work style of the party bureau and the entire party organization.

I would not say that our Communists are just an inert mass. Most of them are energetic people, prepared, so to speak, to spend their days and nights on the job. Many of

them are not themselves, if I may put it that way, in the party life, however. I have pondered why this is so more than once.

I remember how many good suggestions our battalion Communists have submitted for intensifying the training process, strengthening discipline and enhancing the political and indoctrination work. But how much of it has been put into effect now? Almost nothing. And not through the fault of those who suggested it. The infamous administrative pressure has gone into play: We don't need that. We will not be supported in this at the top. Don't get involved in that at all; "it is not on your level." Are these not the scissors which sever the unity of words and actions and snip away the vital initiative of people, the prestige of party members and the militancy of the party organization as a whole?

I recall the fervent support demonstrated by all the Communists for measures aimed at democratizing intra-party relations and enhancing party influence on the personnel work. How enthusiastically they collectively discussed candidates to fill a vacant company commander's position, for example. Particularly since it had been announced that the party organization's opinion would certainly be taken into account. They settled on Capt Yu. Doroshchenko. A worthy candidate in all respects. No one was disturbed by the fact that he was not a party member.

The reader has probably guessed how the "game of democracy" ended: with the appointment of a different officer.

Or take this incident. NCOs have performed guard duty in the regiment for more than just a single month now. For the junior commanders this means service one day, detail the next, so to speak. They have essentially been excluded from the training and indoctrinational process. We discussed the situation in our party collective and decided to request higher headquarters to abolish this practice. It was all in vain. They did not even respond to our reasoning. It is as though the battalion party organization is a nonentity. Need I say what kind of sentiments this attitude generates in the Communists? Many of them throw up their hands and lose faith in the party organization's ability to get anything done. Their reasoning is approximately the following. The real work is performed somewhere at the top. We are just tiny "cogs" who can do nothing. In my opinion, the mentality of indifference and dependency is rooted here.

What gives rise to all of this? In my opinion, the cause lies in the fact that the very role of the primary party organizations was deformed by the powerful administrative pressure during the years of stagnation. In some places they were changed from the political vanguard of the masses into a sort of appendage of the command apparatus, obediently carrying out its instructions. Take the elected party organs. We have seen from our own experience that in many cases they are goaded by almost all of those in charge. How many times, for example,

have we seen a chief, because of the mood he was in, "issue instructions" to the secretary of the party bureau or committee to bring some Communist to accountability. Some of them even define the punishment then and there: Take him down a notch or two! Put it on his record! At one time, as secretary of a company party organization, I myself carried out such instructions. And I thought I was doing the right thing. To our great shame, some individuals are still doing that.

How can we protect party life from unbridled administrative ire? I am convinced that guarantees have to be set forth in the party Charter, in the Statute on Political Organs and Instructions to CPSU Organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy. I believe that the collective counsel in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA will help us to determine how best to accomplish this.

It is painful to see how slowly we are ridding ourselves of the service syndrome. One might say that we have become apathetic in the stream of daily affairs, that we flow with the current. I recall a meeting at which it was planned to discuss the situation in the party, how we could increase its prestige and overcome the lag in the democratization of party life. These are large-scale issues which today, during preparations for the next, 28th, CPSU Congress, one could say, are at the forefront of public attention. And what happened? The general discussion somehow turned without our noticing it to that which we had discussed everyday at service conferences: the equipment, discipline, internal order in the barracks. Our entrapment in this cycle is in great part preventing us from renewing party life, from making it full and spiritually rich.

And in this respect, I believe that Sr Lt Martynov offered us all a good lesson.

Opinion on Restructuring of Combat Arms, Conversion

90UM0098C Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 12 Nov 89 p 1

[Article by Andrey Krayniy, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent for military matters, under the rubric "Everyday at this Spot": "Mark Time... Quick March!"]

[Text] This morning I met a neighbor near the elevator. He simply shrugged off my usual "How are things?". "Don't ask. My head is spinning from all this reduction." It turned out that he, an officer with the General Staff, had learned about the 500,000-man reduction in the Armed Forces from the newspapers. Now he had to rack his brain to figure out, as an example, where to house the military unit arriving within its native borders from abroad. There were combat positions and barracks available, but the DOS (officer housing) was occupied by a unit previously cut back. There was a reduction on paper, but the families of servicemen were living there. Where were they to be housed?

I recall how, during the current president's first trips in the nation, people asked him warily on the streets: "Mikhail Sergeyevich, isn't it dangerous for us to disarm so much"? And the Chairman of the Defense Council reassured them: "Don't worry, comrades." Today, those same people are passionately saying "Root out these parasites in shoulder boards!" Saying it so passionately the president has to remind them that we cannot get along without an army. To soccer and agriculture—things understood by everyone—in my opinion, the army has now been added.

Many say that the military budget is inflated. They possibly do not know what to compare it with. With the American budget? There, unlike here, there is real competition among companies for providing the Pentagon with this or that type of weapons. Here, however, we have a monopoly. Two design offices, Tupolev and Myasishchev, worked on the long-range aviation. But how long ago? We now have one, Tupolev. What is offered, the army must take; there is nothing to choose from. It is the same situation with other branches of the Armed Forces: the Ground Forces and the Air Defense Forces. Just how does a new weapon actually come into being? Hypothetically, the military men told those in industry in the '60s: "We need a radar station for detecting strategic bombers like the B-52. Can you make it"? What a question! Years passed: "Just when"? "Be patient." And then finally industry reported: "Take what you ordered." "For pity's sake! Twenty years have gone by. We now have cruise missiles and we need a station for detecting low-altitude targets." The answer: "Take what you get. You asked for it." And they try by fair means or foul to push it through because of the prizes (state prizes, incidentally) and the Hero title—for the designer—and increments "for mastering production of a new item" for the workers at plant "X." And the army takes it. What can it do? And God only knows how much money was spent on that station during the 20 years. But is it the fault of the army? And is the Ministry of Defense to blame? It has enough deficiencies of its own. Why attribute others to it?

It is awkward to speak in generalities, but the army does not live in empty space. It lives in the society, and if the society is sick, the army cannot be healthy.

Just as the question of the quality of life did not come up for many years in the society, it was the same in the army. And the strategic missile-carriers did not hasten back to their own airfields so much because the pilots were homesick after a flight of many hours, but because the hot water would be turned off, and the heart of the officer in the antiaircraft missile battalion ached when he assumed alert duty because he left his wife and a small baby in the "Finnish" hut, and ice formed on the inside walls of that hut. And submariners returned after many months at sea to communal ("38 cubicles") apartments. And what about the officer dormitories? For each model dormitory there are 10 which are a fright to enter.

The gold on the officer's shoulder boards is losing its luster (or is the gilt peeling off?). People are tired of a situation in which there is always room for a feat at home. They want a normal, civilized life. And also normal service, without the ineradicable "I am the chief; you are a fool." They write out their requests [for discharge] and leave. The lieutenants, the army's future, are leaving.

And if the society was developed by the extensive method for many years, the army kept up with it. The same way it is being reduced, incidentally. The manning tables are being reduced today. The little blocks are being scratched out. Where there were five men, three are left. And we have situations like that in one of the air defense regiments, which had a depot of explosives of enormous destructive force "under its wing." There was a chief, a warrant officer, at the depot. His position was cut. They entrusted his job to someone else as part of his "volunteer load." And he looks after the depot "on a volunteer basis." He is up to his ears in work of his own. It is just a matter of time until disaster strikes. And who can be held accountable?

There is no question that the army needs to be reduced. I am just afraid that we did not perform any calculations before doing the cutting, however. The reduction should be structured. The other day I was talking with Col Mikhail Bashkirov, a graduate of the General Staff Academy. "In my opinion," he said, "we need to leave three branches of the Armed Forces: the Ground Forces, cutting them drastically and organizing them like the airborne troop; the Air Forces, which would include the air defense forces plus the present Strategic Missile Troops; and the Navy. That is all! Such structural changes would make it possible both to reduce the army in size and improve it qualitatively."

In other words, we need a competitive restructuring of the army and also of the defense industry. I am sorry but the conversion, which everyone unanimously applauds, has not convinced me. I'm afraid that the little islands of more or less decent quality represented by the defense plants will easily be swallowed up in the sea of unprofessional performance by most of the other enterprises. And just what is going to force the defense industry to throw its weight into the harness of peacetime production? The shortage in the market is such that the consumer will buy whatever is offered and even give a bow of gratitude.

...And we continue to read in the newspapers: Abuse of underlings; give us a professional army; give us ethnic military formations!"

Do the writers not know that abuse of underlings is not as frightening today as are the "ethnic groupings" involved? With respect to professionalism, this process proceeds objectively even without coercion. The submarine fleet, the Strategic Missile Troops and in many ways the aviation are already a professional army today.

I am afraid. Afraid not of the enemy—there has truly been a thawing in the world, and, despite its shortcomings, our army is still a powerful one. I am afraid of the aggressive ignorance which is so conveniently manipulated. I am afraid of the conservatives in the shoulder boards who want absolutely no changes in the fairly unhealthy army body.

They strain; others bolster them. Who is going to do the healing?

November Conference: 'New Thinking and Military Policy'

90UM0098B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by B. Ivanov: "What the Army Should be Like in the Peacetime Situation"]

[Text] Where do the questions of war and peace rank today among global problems of the contemporary era? Have relations between the army and the society been changed by the new realities which have developed in the military area of late? What should the army be like in the peacetime situation, and is one needed at all? Which come first: general human priorities or national security? These and many other issues were the focus of attention of participants in the international scientific conference on "New Thinking and Military Policy" held in Moscow from 14 through 16 November.

"The idea of conducting such a forum was conceived in the Problems of Peace and War section of the USSR Philosophy Society," the IZVESTIYA correspondent was told by Maj Gen M.A. Chaldymov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and deputy chairman of the organizing committee for the conference. "It is inseparably linked to what is occurring in our nation today. The words perestroika and glasnost are well known in the West, but mainly as applicable to the political and economic areas. The military is left in the background, as it were (I am not referring to the arms reduction talks presently underway, of course), although when I have been abroad I have met military men at various levels and sensed an unfeigned interest in the changes affecting our armed forces. It is therefore my opinion that our forum provides a good opportunity to exchange opinions on various aspects of military policy and strategy in the nuclear age and to discuss current problems of military thought in the situation of the new political thinking and the realities of international life which have become a fact in recent years.

This conference is an extremely unusual event for our nation with respect to the number and composition of the participants and the kinds of questions to be discussed. The interest demonstrated in this event in the West, primarily in the NATO nations, has surpassed all our expectations. We initially anticipated 400-500 participants. As of today, however, more than 1,500 people from 40 nations—military, political and public figures and scientists—have expressed a desire to come to

Moscow. They include V. Scheelen, a professor from the Netherlands and chairman of the European scientific group "The Army and the Society"; Adm J. Eberly, director of Great Britain's Royal Institute of International Relations; former U.S. Defense Minister R. McNamara; and U.S. Senator R. Kasten.

With respect to the objective of the conference, in my opinion, it unquestionably goes beyond the framework of purely theoretical discussion and debate. I believe that the Moscow forum will be a small but important step toward future joint search for ways to work out a common international military doctrine which will eliminate preparations for war. In other words, our conference is the beginning of a process of collective search for collective security on the international scale.

Law On Ecology, Question Of Semipalatinsk Test Range

90UM0133A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Nov 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Captain Third Class V. Urban: "Second Session Of The USSR Supreme Soviet: Discussion Of Ecology"]

[Text] S. S. Alekseyev, chairman of the Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order Committee, has termed the parliament's adoption of the Basic Principles of USSR and Union-Republic Legislation On Leasing and Leasing Relations a fitting finale to two months of work. In an unprecedented occurrence for the new Supreme Soviet, the draft law became a legislative act on the first presentation, so to speak. The basic legislative principles will take effect on January 1, 1990.

Efforts to adopt urgent measures to improve the country's ecological health have proved far more difficult. The issues involved are of extraordinary importance indeed. In 103 cities (with a combined population of more than 50 million people), the maximum allowable concentrations of hazardous substances in the air have been exceeded 10-fold or more. What must be done?

Specific plans have become a subject of the most heated debate. The question of closing the Semipalatinsk nuclear test range has been raised several times. In this connection, Deputies Colonel N. S. Petrushenko and Academician Ye. P. Velikhov have emphasized that this question must be approached in a prudent manner, without emotion, and on the basis of realities. V. Kh. Doguzhiyev, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who also spoke at the session, expressed a similar point of view.

Subordination Of Military Trade Facilities

90UM0133B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article: "Inspection Refused"]

[Text] The executive committee of our rural soviet asks the editors to explain who has the right to inspect military trade stores for concealment of goods from customers.

What has raised this question? The problem is that, on the morning of September 29, a military trade store in our settlement was visited by Militia Lieutenant I. Zotkin, an inspector for the rayon Department for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation; Militia Captain Didych; and Militia Captain I. Zhdanov, a divisional inspector.

Inspector Zotkin introduced himself to store manager I. Kostyleva, showed her his identification card, and notified her that he would like to inspect the store for concealment of goods from the public. In response, Kostyleva said that she would allow the store to be inspected only with the permission of the unit commander.

No inspection was conducted. The question therefore arose: Who has the right to monitor the work of trade facilities of this kind? And is this right given to the rural soviet executive committee's people's control commission, and to agencies for combatting the embezzlement of socialist property and speculation?

A. Levina, chairman of the rural soviet executive committee.

The editors asked Major General Ye. Kruglov, First Deputy Chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Trade Directorate, to answer these questions. Here is what he said.

Oversight of the operation of military trade enterprises is exercised by representatives of social, worker, and people's control bodies and by military procuracies.

In addition, in accordance with a 1987 joint order of the USSR Minister of Defense and the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, agencies for combatting embezzlement of socialist property are charged with the operational oversight [obsluzhivaniye] of military trade enterprises and organizations, with the exception of those located on the grounds of units and institutions subject to special regulations.

I think that had the officers of the anti-embezzlement department been familiar with that document's requirements, they would doubtless not have had questions as to how to properly proceed.

The aforementioned order says that specially assigned internal affairs case officers are to be admitted to the grounds of units, institutions, and military educational institutions and to enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense for the purpose of implementing operational-investigative measures, including at military trade facilities. With the consent in each instance, needless to say, of the commanding officers and chiefs, and on some occasions on their initiative.

For example, on the initiative of the Baltic Fleet Trade Directorate, officers of anti-embezzlement agencies have been called on to inspect trade facilities in the Tallinn garrison. But we are not opposed to surprise inspections either.

But what happened in this instance? A group of militia officers suddenly showed up to the complete surprise of the commanding officers. And they were required to wait until the unit commander, who was occupied at the moment, was free. However, the anti-embezzlement officers and local divisional inspector left and never came back. This is all the more unusual in that they had traveled several hundred kilometers to get to the store. I have no doubt that, had they waited for the commander, they would have doubtless received permission to conduct an inspection.

I would like to mention one more thing. That useless "visit" nevertheless spawned rumors and cast suspicions on the compound's military trade employees. Meanwhile, had the anti-embezzlement officers enlisted people's control workers and the social control commission in their work, people would never have started asking perplexing [nedoumennyykh] questions. You will agree that the people who live and work in garrisons and units are no less interested than the anti-embezzlement department is in ensuring that trade regulations are observed.

Sole Military Candidate From Estonia for City Soviet Interviewed

90UM0138A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Nov 89 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Captain 2d Rank A.Yu. Karaulov by Lieutenant Colonel S. Pashayev, under the rubric "Estonia—Elections to the Local Soviets": "One out of 288"]

[Text] Captain 2d Rank Aleksandr Karaulov is 38 years old. He was born in Leningrad and his father was a naval architect. He and his parents moved to Tallinn in 1958. Having graduated from school here, he departed to enter the Higher Naval School of Electronics imeni A.S. Popov. After his studies and several years of service on ships of the Baltic Navy, he returned to Tallinn.

The inhabitants of Tallinn's Astangu Street, using the procedure of citizen initiative, have nominated him candidate for deputy to the city soviet.

[Pashayev] Aleksandr Yuryevich, it seems that not all our readers are familiar with the phrase "procedure of citizen initiative." Please explain it.

[Karaulov] The new Law on Elections to the Local ESSR Soviets—which, by the way, has been declared by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet inconsistent with the USSR Constitution, although it has not been reversed—provides for the nomination of a candidate at the initiative of a specific number of voters. In this instance I had to obtain the support of 50 people in order

to claim the right to be a candidate. The second condition was certainly no problem for me—a Tallinn residence requirement. The minimum established here is 5 years. As a result I have become 1 of 288 candidates for 80 deputy seats in the city soviet.

I am the only serviceman, by the way, nominated "from the territory."

[Pashayev] In other words, together with that officer or warrant officer whom they will elect to the seat stipulated and guaranteed by the Law "for the military garrison," there will be two of you at most?

[Karaulov] Yes, if they elect me then there will be two of us. Not a very large force, as we say.

[Pashayev] Given the discriminatory nature of the new Law toward a portion of the population and its nonconformance with the USSR Constitution, a number of Estonia's social organizations have called upon voters to boycott the elections. What is your reaction to this?

[Karaulov] The situation in the republic today is very complex. The reasons for this are the irreconcilable positions of the representatives of the opposing social movements, the passive and temporizing leadership of the Estonian Communist Party, and a real division of people along lines of nationality... All of this puts a strain on the situation and makes it unstable and unpredictable. I am sure it could become more strained yet, but should this be our goal?

I understand the reasons urging on the Intermovement, the Associated Council of Labor Collectives, and the veterans organizations to boycott the elections. But I do not share their opinion. It leads to a deadlock. And it does not gain anything, because even if the whole Russian-speaking population (and that is 40% of the population of Estonia) supports the idea of a boycott, the elections will still take place. And it strengthens the position of those who oppose the aspirations of the non-Estonian part of the population. Particularly the People's Front, which has abandoned its disguise and declared as its goal the republic's secession from the USSR. Who will defend the interests of the hundreds of families of officers and warrant officers then?

[Pashayev] As you enter the pre-election contest, do you feel you have a real chance to win?

[Karaulov] I expect to win, even though I have 13 rivals. There are both Russians and Estonians among them. There is a first secretary of the rayon party committee, a chairman of a production association trade union, a silk-screener from a textiles and fine goods factory, and an inspector from the Committee of People's Control... They are people of various convictions, with their own programs, ideas, and positions.

[Pashayev] As everybody knows, a candidate's program increases his chances for victory. Tell us about yours.

[Karaulov] First of all I have tried to refrain as much as possible from politicizing it. I believe that it must rally people to solve the social problems which trouble those of us in the city. Tallinn must become a clean, comfortable, hospitable city where the distinctive national and cultural traditions of the people living on this ancient soil are preserved and developed. We must hasten construction of projects in the social realm, promote the development of popular sports, and take effective measures to preserve the environment.

[Pashayev] It seems that the voters are also interested in your views on Army and Navy problems.

[Karaulov] Yes, and their interest is warranted because an absolute majority of us are involved with the Army in one fashion or another. Our fathers and sons have served or are serving in the military, sometimes we live near military facilities, or we simply see and hear about what is happening in the Army. I am for making the military more democratic and humane. I am for a considerate and attentive attitude toward the soldiers. In particular, I am for an assured, guaranteed furlough for them. I am

for resolving the social problems of the officers' families. These are aggravated, painful problems which give rise to disappointment and resentment.

[Pashayev] Who is assisting you in the election campaign?

[Karaulov] The officers S. Volkov, V. Antipov, G. Tabachnik, V. Zhumadilov, and the warrant officer A. Kyute are acting on my behalf. They are men of principle, honesty, and initiative. They already have plenty of work. There are contacts with voters, studying the platform, and concerns about campaign graphics.

The voting centers opened on 25 November. There are seven of them in my district. I have to reach 16,000 voters. Because I am new to this, it will be rather difficult. But I am being helped, supported, and encouraged in this work not only by those acting for me, but by my commanders, subordinates, and the voters. The elections are not far away—10 December—but I am an optimist.

Military Procuracy Official on Draft Regulations

90UM0156A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 18, Sep 89
[Signed to press 07 Sep 89] pp 49-54

[Article by Col Justice V. Bobrenev, deputy chief of the Main Military Procuracy's Section for the Systematization and Propaganda of Soviet Law, under the rubric "We Discuss the Draft General Military Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR": "Legal Protection for Servicemen: From Proclamations to Guarantees"]

[Text] About the author: Vladimir Aleksandrovich Bobrenev graduated from the Ryazan Military Communications School. After graduating from the Military Law School at the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin he served in agencies of the military procuracy in the Transcaucasus Military District. He has served in the Main Military Procuracy since 1982.

The draft of new general military regulations has been published in the press for discussion. They were developed over an period of several years. Various dates have been set for putting the new regulations into effect. It was first proposed that they take effect in 1988 and then in 1989. Each time, however, the adoption of this extremely important compilation of military laws was postponed for an indefinite period. There were several reasons for this. Perhaps the main one, however, was the fact that previous drafts contained no fundamentally new approaches to the regulation of our military life.

Have we finally succeeded in incorporating in our regulations the answers to all the main questions which might arise in the military service process? It would be fairly difficult to answer this question unequivocally. It is perfectly apparent, however, that the drafts submitted for discussion still contain substantial shortcomings. The purpose of the general discussion should therefore be that of further improving the general military regulations, taking into account the full range of opinions of commanders, political workers, the army and navy community and all Armed Forces personnel.

We are publishing here the opinion of a military legal expert on regulations governing the legal aspects of service relations.

In my opinion, the draft Internal Service Regulations still clearly do not adequately reflect the concepts of the restructuring and democratization of the Soviet society, the formation of a law-based socialist society, social and legal protection for servicemen and the securing of their lawful interests.

Article 6, for example, contains a provision proclaiming that legal protection for the individual serviceman is a subject of paramount state concern. The fact is stressed that the serviceman enjoys all of the socioeconomic, political and personal rights and liberties and has all of the duties specified by the Constitution of the USSR and legislative enactments. The final phrase, "taking into

account specific circumstances of the military service," however, significantly constricts the substance of this important standard, makes it somewhat proclamatory and eliminates any sort of guarantee that the rights and freedoms proclaimed will be realized. The regulations do not say what these specific circumstances are or what part of the rights of a serviceman as a citizen of the USSR they limit. This means that in each specific case the OIC determines what is permissible and what is forbidden, based on his own understanding of the specific features and circumstances of the service and its interests.

So many times we have encountered these "interests and circumstances," from appeals for a soldier's resourcefulness such as "get it wherever you like, but it had better be here by morning" to all sorts of absurd bans on swimming while on leave, having a radio or a camera in the subunit, traveling in one's own vehicle outside the housing area....

All restrictions based on the specific circumstances of the military service should be defined in the regulations. The list should be an exhaustive one, specific and not subject to any sort of broad interpretations. The attempt to regulate the rights of servicemen in the Law of the USSR "On Universal Military Duty" and in other legislative enactments has not been successful since they too have not properly spelled out these rights.

The principle that "everything is permitted which is not forbidden by law" proclaimed at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference also requires that restrictions pertaining to servicemen be defined in the Internal Service Regulations. The passage of the regulations by the USSR Supreme Soviet will give them the status of an All-Union law. All other enactments regulating specific aspects of the military service for various categories of servicemen are approved either by government decrees or by orders issued by the USSR Minister of Defense. They are not laws and can serve only as legislative standards.

It would seem justified to replace the vague restriction of rights with approximately the following version of Article 39 in the Constitution of the USSR as applicable to servicemen: "The exercise of the serviceman's rights and liberties must not be detrimental to the interests of the Soviet state's defense capability, the combat readiness of the army and navy or the rights of other servicemen and citizens." This would shift the focus from administrative bans to an appeal primarily to the serviceman's cognizance. As a citizen and an individual he has to weigh his interests and possibilities for realizing his rights against the state's interests—specifically, the interests of accomplishing the missions assigned the military unit. The commander (OIC) in turn is given the criterion for defining all sorts of bans and restrictions: those same interests of the state and combat readiness and the regiment's missions as applicable to the specific situation.

Article 9 of the draft can probably not be left in its present form: "Nothing, including the threat of death, should force a serviceman of the Armed Forces of the USSR to surrender." The Law on Criminal Accountability for Military Crimes (Article 28) recognizes as a crime only voluntary surrender out of cowardice or fear. Forced surrender for other motives or resulting from some sort of unusual circumstances is not criminally punishable under Soviet law. In addition, the demand that death be preferred over imprisonment, particularly forced imprisonment, is clearly not a commensurate alternative and is quite inhumane. It would seem that the last paragraph of Article 9 should be set forth in the following form: Betrayal of the homeland and voluntary surrender out of cowardice or fear are heinous crimes against the Soviet people.

Because of the multi-ethnic makeup of our Armed Forces, we feel that Article 42 of the Internal Service Regulations should be supplemented to make it the duty of servicemen to respect the personal and ethnic dignity of other individuals.

With respect to the general obligations of commanders and other OICs, it should be noted that these matters are defined in the Internal Service Regulations only with respect to OICs from the regimental level down. But their decision depends in great part—perhaps an understatement—upon the actions of superior commanders and staffs, supply agencies and services and the directors and OICs of other agencies of military command and control. The successful accomplishment of the missions assigned the troops depends to a considerable degree upon how thoroughly they support the combat and political training of the regiment (military unit) with the necessary materials and equipment, deliver the required types of rations, pay and allowances and provide [good] living conditions for the personnel. The obligations of higher agencies of military command and control to the regiment (military unit) are not defined, however. This creates a certain vagueness regarding their legal situation and does not permit higher OICs to be held fully accountable for the situation at the sites in the areas entrusted to them. Incidentally, this situation suits some people perfectly well, since it permits them to justify their actions with vague statements about taking the matter into account and the like. This gives rise to inadequate accountability for supporting the life and functioning of the troops and inadequate attention to the daily needs and requests of the personnel on the part of certain OICs.

Incidentally, the Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties fairly thoroughly defines the authority not just of OICs at the regimental level but of all higher OICs right up to the Minister of Defense. In view of these conclusions it would appear expedient to begin Chapter 2 of the Internal Service Regulations with a legal standard establishing the duties of the commander of a division, the staff, sections and services of the formation, as well as the OICs of other higher headquarters and agencies of military command and control, with respect to ensuring

the combat readiness of the regiment (military unit), organizing the combat and political training, creating the living conditions essential to the daily life and functioning of the personnel and delivering all types of rations, pay and allowances in accordance with the established norms. This definition of the matter would make it possible to judge the role of each senior OIC not from the number of orders, instructions, directives and commissions sent out but based on the specific end results of his performance.

One hears a great deal today about the absence of proper concern for and attention to the needs and requests and the social protection of the officers. Unfortunately, the draft regulations do not contain enough basic new approaches to this problem, even though right now is the time for this. Let us look at Chapter 4 of the Internal Service Regulations, "The Quartering of Servicemen." It provides a detailed list of essential facilities, from sleeping quarters to drying rooms, the conditions for housing the personnel of a company, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers and female military personnel, and so forth. All of this is traditional and is unquestionably correct and vitally necessary. For some reason, however, it does not state the conditions under which the officer and his family should live (that is, be housed).

Some will argue that housing provisions for officers and their families are regulated by general civilian law and special guiding documents of the Ministry of Defense. We believe that it is precisely this approach, developed over the years, which has greatly contributed to the exacerbation of the housing matter and resulted in the clearly abnormal situation we have today with respect to providing the officers with housing.

Officers are a special category of citizens of the USSR. They serve on active duty. They therefore do not reside where they want to but where they are ordered to reside by the command element. They therefore need special legislative guarantees that their constitutional right to housing will be realized. It is time to consider housing as one type of guaranteed rations in kind which, under Article 69 of the Law of the USSR "On Universal Military Duty," they are to receive at state expense. We cannot continue to have a situation in which the officer waits years for that which is legally due him.

In view of this, it is my opinion that we should add a special standard to Chapter 4, "The Housing of Servicemen," defining the procedure for housing officers. Furthermore, the regulation should provide for military living quarters based on specific norms for the commanders of subunits who work directly with personnel. If it is impossible to provide this immediately, provisions should be made for the temporary housing of officers and their families in dormitories of the regiment (military unit). This would immediately make the matter of providing housing a direct regulation requirement of commanders and other OICs both at the regimental level and higher.

Incidentally, special decrees passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers specify that young specialists who complete higher or secondary specialized institutions and move to an assigned station are to be provided with housing (apartments or space in dormitories, including those for families) immediately, out of turn, by those enterprises to which they are sent. This procedure is in effect for individuals who move to other locations to work under organized recruitment. Why not establish the same right to housing for officers?

The regulation of duty time for officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers applies to this same area of social rights. This has strangely been overlooked in the draft Internal Service Regulation. We need not consider any real changes but should at least ensure that which is specified today in existing orders issued by the Minister of Defense. I have in mind adding to Chapter 5 of the Internal Service Regulations a special article specifying the length of normal duty hours for officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers (41 hours per week according to the Constitution of the USSR), as well as the mandatory provision of all categories of servicemen with weekly days-off. We should precisely stipulate the specific circumstances and cases in which duty time may exceed the normal work day. I refer to serving on detail, on alert duty, in exercises and other special activities and in a state of heightened combat readiness.

The inadmissibility of taking personnel away from combat and political training and from other military duties has been discussed many times. This is not only not being eliminated but is becoming more and more widespread in some places. Some OICs are prepared to send a dozen or more soldiers to a railway station to pick up trash on the territory so that as a return favor complaints are not made about them some other time for lack of organization in the unloading of a railroad car arriving for the unit.

I do not think there is any need to discuss the detriment to the military training and indoctrinational process caused by sending servicemen to perform all sorts of unauthorized jobs. In addition to everything else, these unlawful acts distort the very essence of military labor. The honored constitutional duty becomes a forced, disfranchised labor obligation. It is a known fact that in such cases the servicemen are assigned the heaviest, most unskilled jobs. How can the military service have authority or prestige in this situation? If we want to end all kinds of degradation of the service, we need to ban the sending of personnel to perform special jobs. The state provides the army and navy with everything they need.

The draft Internal Service Regulations (Article 201) attempts to restrict but not ban the removal of personnel from classes, but it appears to be only a half-measure. In the first place, it bans only their removal from combat and political training, although this is not all there is to the service activities of the servicemen by far. Furthermore, the so-called special jobs are performed either

after the training period has ended or prior to the beginning of the new training year, when no classes are held.

It is perfectly appropriate to ask whether soldiers may or may not be sent to a railway to unload cars for others during their free time, on pool maintenance days and days-off, even at night. The draft does not answer this question. Such undertakings are therefore not ruled out in principle, particularly for those categories of personnel who are not involved in the training but perform some other service duties. Those serving in repair or administrative subunits, for example. One has the impression that those who wrote up the draft simply evaded an absolute ban and left loopholes for continuing the illegal practice of taking personnel away from their military duties.

It would seem that the Internal Service Regulations should contain an article forbidding servicemen from being taken away both from their combat and political training and from other activities pertaining to the missions required to maintain combat readiness and perform the military service, with the exception of cases specified in laws of the USSR, military regulations and special decrees of the government of the USSR.

Restrictions on the rights of servicemen to free time contained in Article 239 of the draft Internal Service Regulations are confusing. It gives individuals not assigned to a daily duty detail on their days-off a weekly day of rest (or even two), but those on regimental, mess hall or guard duty do not have the day of rest. And the detail is the most difficult and stressful form of military service. Those going off a detail on their day-off, particularly if it is an evening detail, have absolutely no time for the normal restoration of their energy or for recovering from the mental stress—that is, even for getting themselves ready for the week ahead. If we are to show real concern for the personnel, we need to extend the rule on providing days of rest during the following week not just to individuals on duty during holidays but also on their days-off.

As a basic measure a special standard forbidding the imposition of penalties upon commanders (OICs) for infractions committed by subordinates needs to be established in the draft Disciplinary Code of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

We know that any sort of legal accountability can be applied only in the case of violations of public relations protected by law—deliberate or due to carelessness. Only the individual directly to blame for the infraction is accountable. This is the basic principle underlying accountability in our Soviet law.

Unfortunately, this approach is far from always taken in the day-to-day military reality. We know of many cases in which responsibility is borne in ascending order by the platoon, company and regimental commander for subordinates who go AWOL. And when something serious occurs, penalties are frequently issued also to OICs at an

even higher level. It is this approach which has produced the harmful practice of covering up violations of military discipline and incidents, when commanders let malicious violators of military discipline, law and order go unpunished in order to avoid all sorts of trouble in the service and severe penalties. Nothing distorts things so much as connivance and a sense of personal impunity. Furthermore, the guilty party knows very well that it is not at all advantageous for the senior OIC to publicize his improper actions, to demonstrate principle and demandingness. All of this leads to additional, sometimes more dangerous manifestations of lack of discipline. At the same time the co-workers of the unpunished guilty party lose their faith in justice and the possibility of achieving it by legal means.

The regulations should therefore perhaps contain a separate article banning the imposition of penalties upon commanders (OICs) for the infractions of subordinates, with the exception of those cases in which the infractions were caused by incorrect actions (or inaction) on the part of the commanders themselves or resulted from conditions which they themselves created. When, as an example, the commander had reliable information that a motor vehicle needed repairs but forced a subordinate driver to depart on a trip during which an accident occurred as a result of the disrepair.

The question of altering the existing procedure for lifting disciplinary penalties was repeatedly brought up during the discussion of the draft Disciplinary Code of the Armed Forces. The provision contained in the draft (Article 40) whereby a penalty is lifted after it has performed its educational role and the serviceman has rectified his behavior by performing his military duty in an exemplary manner seems fairly vague. In principle it is possible for a conscientious serviceman to be disciplined for some isolated omission or personal indiscretion. This sometimes depends even upon the OIC's mood. One can be penalized for something which can be corrected immediately, after all: for being out of uniform, for example, when a totally disciplined serviceman appears before someone of senior rank or position with his shirt pocket unbuttoned.

The code takes a fairly subjective approach to the lifting of penalties, since the OIC himself makes the entire determination as to whether the penalty has played its indoctrinational role and the serviceman's conduct is exemplary. At the same time, other grounds for lifting penalties have been established along with this one in practically all other branches. Among other things, the absence of any new and deliberate infractions on the part of the penalized individual for a certain period of time (a year, 6 months) is grounds for considering the previous infraction expunged, and the penalties are removed from the records of the one who committed it.

We believe that it would be absolutely correct, along with the grounds for lifting penalties already included in the draft Disciplinary Code, to provide for their expunction

if no additional deliberate infraction of military discipline has been committed for a certain period of time following the imposition of the last penalty. People would not be categorized for years as violators of discipline because the OIC has simply forgotten about the penalty imposed or does not want to lift it because he has no liking for the individual subordinate.

To the list of disciplinary penalties should be added the measure of discharging officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers from the military service for infractions discrediting the military rank. This measure is already contained in regulations governing the military service of officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers of the Armed Forces. Incidentally, such infractions are similarly assessed in labor law and in the charters of various societies and organizations. We ignore the perfectly obvious fact that this most severe measure is not a penalty in the army and navy today. A spade should be called a spade. Something else: Some specific procedure should be established for implementing this measure, for imposing this penalty, and the group of OICs vested with authority to apply it should be defined. It is perfectly clear that the application of this penalty, as well as demotions in rank or position, should be preceded by thorough verification of all the factors contributing to the infraction, a study of personal records and consideration of the opinion of the command element and the military collective. And this should be stated in the code.

It would appear expedient to add to the Disciplinary Code as separate addenda statutes on comradesly courts of honor of officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, as well as a statute on the officers' assembly. These documents have direct relevance to the strengthening of military discipline, law and order.

And the last thing: We believe that the 2nd paragraph, which vests in the command element authority to determine the type of accountability (disciplinary or criminal) for servicemen who have committed military crimes, should be removed from Article 44 of the draft Disciplinary Code. The previous coordinating procedure was abolished by a 12 April 1989 ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The matter of arresting servicemen and holding them criminally accountable is decided on the basis of general principles applicable to all citizens of the USSR—that is, by a court, a procurator and an investigator.

These are a few ideas concerning a number of questions pertaining to the regulation of the legal aspects of military activities and the situation of servicemen. Not all of them are incontrovertible, of course, and there may be other views on these aspects of army and navy life. The main thing is that there are problems and they have to be resolved.

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Survey of Officers on Standard of Living
90UM0066B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Oct 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by S. Taranov: "How are Officers Living"]

[Text] The Ministry of Defense, along with the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, has conducted a comprehensive study of the social status of officers and their families.

"To be discharged—this is now my main goal. I have not yet written a request, since there is no where to go with the family. But it is suffocating to serve in such a situation. For 12 to 14 hours of work per day, and for 10 or 12 daily duty details per month they pay 260 rubles. I cannot buy clothes for my wife. It is shameful. I cannot help my parents, who are on pension. This is also shameful. And what am I to do? Maybe make for the racketeers!" These lines are from the questionnaire of a young officer serving in one of the units in the Leningrad Military District. Judging by the results of the study, pessimistic, or even embittered moods in the midst of professional military men are in no way a rarity.

Almost 1,800 officers, 250 warrant officers, 300 wives of officers and warrant officers, and more than 150 cadets were encompassed by the questionnaires and group and individual discussions.

Ninety-one percent of those polled acknowledged that their pay, given today's inflation and shortages, does not correspond to the expenditures of physical and moral forces, and to the tremendous burdens. After all, officers, especially young officers, must be on duty 12-15 hours per day, and day's off occur once a month, or even less frequently. There is no time to solve everyday life and family problems, or to educate the children, or rest.

Housing is worst of all. In some garrisons up to half or more of the officers do not have apartments. They must pay out of their own pocket an average of 60-100 rubles per month to rent housing. Meanwhile, prices on the apartment "market" are rising everyday. (In Moscow, for a one room apartment without furniture, up to 300 rubles a month is already being demanded, and for a two room apartment, up to 500 and more). A most acute problem, as in the past, remains finding work for the wives of military personnel; it is good if half of the women can work in or around the garrison. In addition to this, there are few places in kindergartens and nurseries, and the expenses officers entail traveling to a new place of service are practically not reimbursed.

Numerous problems are arising in connection with the reduction of the Armed Forces. Instead of the expected increase in pay for those continuing to serve, exactly the opposite is taking place, when an officer, after his position category is reduced, also has his pay cut.

As a result, a "demobilization" frame of mind is being created. In the Leningrad Military District alone,

approximately 200 requests for discharge into the reserves have been submitted, the majority from young officers.

It is interesting that, among the reasons forcing them to retire early, 62 percent of those questioned named poor organization of the entire service process, and the fulfillment of numerous duties not appropriate to combat officers. "There is no combat or political training. The regiment has been made into a guard unit." We are becoming work superintendents at construction sites and guards," such are the most widespread responses.

The drop in prestige of the Armed Forces in society troubles 36 percent of the officers. Frequently a wave of dissatisfaction concerning army problems splashes on specific military personnel, who are honorably fulfilling their duties. Various labels disseminated by informal organizations are especially shameful. As a result of this, it is an infringement on the civil rights of military personnel, on their obtaining housing and transportation passes, and on the right to vote in elections. Meanwhile, in other countries insults directed at military personnel are considered impermissible and are strictly punishable by law.

The conclusion drawn by the specialists based on the results of the survey is alarming: "The frames of mind of a significant portion of the officers are creating a crisis situation in the army." Among the proposals meriting the soonest examination (and not only in the Ministry of Defense, but also, it is believed, in the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the government), we name the following: within the framework of the military budget find funds to increase position pay, especially for young officers; introduce monetary compensation for housing rental and additional pay for fulfilling daily duty details; re-examine the structure of the army, and, by reducing certain troop formations, create full strength divisions and regiments, which can engage normally in combat and political training.

I would like to say a few words about the course of the study. Maj Gen V. Kanarik, senior inspector in the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, who headed it up, noted the uncommon frankness and openness of the officers, warrant officers and cadets with whom he talked. Perhaps this is one of the chief gains thus far of army perestroika—the opportunity to hear and understand one another, and to speak what one wishes, and not only that which pleases the ears of the leadership. Many officers have their own very business-like proposals on how to improve the service, and raise its efficiency and prestige. Alas, they are far from always listened to, a fact indicated by the "army" mail received by IZVESTIYA. Frequently concerned people must retire altogether, or be discharged from the army ahead of time. Losses of this type are irreplaceable.

Proposal to Create Regimental Deputy Commander for Economic Questions

90UM0066A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Oct 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col B. Titov, department chief, Financial Service, Central Group of Forces: "Although He Put Nothing into his Own Pocket"]

[Text] It is gratifying that of late questions associated with the economics of troop-level administration are taking on increasing urgency. The need for changes in the sphere of life of the army and navy stems from the economic reform being conducted in our country.

The changes now taking place in the activity of the USSR Ministry of Defense Financial Service are, to some degree, increasing the responsibility of unit and subunit commanders for the effective use of allocated moneys. The certain independence granted to them is contributing most to this. But, in my view, this is not solving, and cannot solve the more general task of achieving high combat readiness with the least material expenditures. Only economic justification of the decisions made by the commander can guarantee this, and this is realistic only if he is competent.

Will the commander analyze the state of economic work in the unit if he, to put it mildly, does not understand everything about these questions? He will not. Yes, it doesn't take a genius to see that he does not consider this a matter of paramount importance. Let us take, for example, construction by the cost accounting method. As a rule, officers who lack even elementary economic knowledge are responsible for it. This frequently results in instances of mismanagement, which I personally have had to confront.

Thus, for five years already a driver training area has been under construction in "X" large unit, and the end of construction is not yet in sight. The trouble is that they are putting up the facility on a former swamp. They did not consult with specialists in choosing the site for the driver training area, and the required calculations were not made. As a result, the actual costs have already exceeded standard costs five times over. And, what is amazing is that not a single commander of his deputy has been brought to accountability for this.

In long years of army service I have not once met an officer, for example, responsible for construction of some facility or another, who concerns himself with the brand of cement, in order to assess its expenditure in the making of concrete, or with the cost of construction materials, in order to save money. When in one of the garrisons, during inspection of the construction of facilities being erected by the cost accounting method, over expenditure of construction materials was disclosed, Lt Col A. Gulyayev, deputy commander of a motorized rifle regiment, answered thus: "I didn't put anything in my pocket." And what decreased in the state's pocket in this matter, as is evident, did not concern him.

Of course, instances of a negligent attitude toward the expenditure of monetary and material resources disclosed in the course of inspections by financial organs are not overlooked. Those at fault received disciplinary punishments, and reimburse, to some degree, the material damage caused. But here is what is characteristic. Strict demands are seemingly made, but matters actually do not change, and shortcomings are repeated year after year. And all of this is because commanders neither did, nor do engage in regimental economic matters.

In conclusion, I want to make some specific proposals. In particular, I believe it is necessary to re-examine the role of the building operation organs in carrying out construction in units and subunits by the cost-accounting method. KECh [building operation unit] repair and construction groups should render much more assistance here than they do now.

Military economists assert that the economics of operation of weapons and combat equipment is still inadequately developed. No doubt here material self-interest is needed. In my opinion, a soldier who spends fewer rounds to strike targets, maintains his combat equipment continuously in an excellent technical condition, and saves on fuels and lubricants, should receive material remuneration for this.

Finally, it would be advisable to introduce the position of economist or assistant commander for economic questions into the regimental table of organization, to which officers would be assigned to have the corresponding education and experience. It is also necessary to re-examine the training of officer personnel within the walls of military educational institutions, and to give them at least minimum economic knowledge, so that they can understand both the "military budget" of their unit, and regimental economics.

Combat Troops Assigned as Unskilled Labor

90UM0079A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by A. Krayniy: "A Potato Boiled in Its Skin"]

[Text] There are different kinds of armies. This is the first time we have run into this "kettle of fish." People in black coveralls and dirty peacoats were at one time (at one time!) combat infantry vehicle driver-mechanics or gunner-operators. Now they are laborers. Stevedores. The transition to worker was rapidly completed according to orders.

"It was about two months ago," recalls Senior Sergeant Pavel Potsko, crew commander. "We were servicing our vehicle when the command came to form up and we were sent here, to the Kuznetsk Fruit and Vegetable Depot. They split us up into teams and well, we are working. We unload rail cars and trucks and we sort potatoes. They say we will be here until December 1st."

That sounds like the truth. There is no special hope at the enterprise right now—cost-accounting. Students want to study. Who can we call for help? The Army! It really is one with the people in our nation. However, it is sad that unity occurs only on the wheat field and only in the cabbage patch. Incidentally, here in the patch, or rather at the depot, to speak in military language "cooperation is being provided by various combat arms and branches of the Armed Forces." PVO [Air Defense Forces] and Ground Forces soldiers are working shoulder to shoulder. And, according to Major Stepan Tunchik who is here as deputy commander for political affairs, there are also soldiers from a civil defense regiment here.

The unity is such that the proper sized tears of emotion should well up. But tears do not well up, questions arise. Probably naive questions. And how is this combat training? And did they send those that they did not need to the depot?

"How can they not be needed?" Major Tunchik gets excited. "For example, I am a battalion deputy commander for political affairs. I had not managed to work in my new position for three days when I was rushed here. And how many vehicles do we have here? Just we have 29 vehicles. Nineteen here and ten at the Kiev Fruit and Vegetable Depot..."

It is he who gets excited while talking with us. Tunchik is a military man, he received his orders, and he is carrying them out. Both he and his subordinates. They work well, they are overfulfilling the plan, and Driver Private Yerkin Kalandaroyev even managed to help expose a group of potato pilferers. Using false documents, they forced him to transport a truckload of potatoes to market but they did not manage to sell them since the soldier called the militia.

All of this is fine but anyway how is this combat training?

"But we have been released from the next test," Junior Sergeant Viktor Melekhoyev, a squad leader, told me. "And what is there here to test when the whole battalion has been working at Moscow area depots since August 10th."

From August 10th to December—almost five months. This is during one year. But a soldier serves two and naturally there are no guarantees that next year the Army will not work at vegetable depots. It is sooner quite the reverse—it is painfully beneficial. It turns out that of two authorized years a soldier will spend one sorting potatoes. Maybe he will learn to do this brilliantly but will he manage to become a combat specialist? If combat infantry vehicle driver-mechanic Vyacheslav Medvedev last saw his BMP [infantry vehicle] in July and gunner-operator Igor Plotnikov last fired three months ago?

Frankly speaking, I cannot understand the pride with which certain military leaders talk about how much grain or cabbage the Army has harvested or how many pigs it has raised. Both the Army and the soldier have one duty: To train. How this does not grate on one's ear during a

thaw [in relations] in the world, to train to fight. To fire, to drive tanks, to pilot aircraft. Lack of professionalism is intolerable anywhere but it is lethally dangerous in the Army. It seems to me that it will not be easy to hit a target with an assault rifle after a three month temporary duty assignment to a vegetable depot.

The officers assembled here are indignant. Lieutenant Sergey Zaichkin said this: "They trained me to do one thing for five years but here I am doing something entirely different. I am an aircraft equipment specialist not a cabbage specialist. And the soldiers, the majority of the soldiers, like this remarkable temporary duty assignment. Self-willed children..."

Looking at them, I think about their temporary duty assignments with sadness. It will be difficult for them when the time comes for the soldiers to return to their units. But they will not return soon.

The combat infantry vehicle gunner-operator grabbed a sack of potatoes and groaned. A driver-mechanic laid his broom aside and came over to help his military comrade. Beyond white the brick wall, the former outstanding launch crew harvested cabbage with skill and experience. Green Urals and ZIL's drove out of the vegetable depot's gates transporting carrots to Moscow stores. And the soldier did not sleep and service continued. Service at the Kuznetsk Fruit and Vegetable Depot.

Cooperatives Seek More Direct Ties with Units, Garrisons

90UM0079B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Oct 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel A. Ladin, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Initiative Seeks a Solution"]

[Text] For the first time in our country, the Kazakh Republic Soyuz Cooperative Association is conducting an all-union exhibition and trade fair. The exhibits are displayed in one of the VDNKh [Exhibitions of Achievements of the National Economy of the USSR] pavilions in Alma-Ata. They belong to 250 cooperative organizations from various republics.

Our correspondent visited here.

Everything that I managed to see left a good impression. It convinces you that we have cooperatives in our country that know how to work conscientiously and with initiative. Many of them showed me products which we have shortages of today and which are in demand. Others are ready to render various services to the customer.

Aleksandr Petrenko, chairman of Gamma Cooperative from Pavlodar, said that there are quite a few reserve soldiers in the collective which he heads. For example, Yuriy Bashkirtsen, his assistant, was a tank crewman until quite recently and served in the Northern Group of Forces. Young people willingly go to the cooperative that

we can say is firmly standing on its own two legs. Right now it is producing photographic chemicals of which there is still a shortage on store shelves and they sew comparatively cheap children's clothing. They recently purchased an abandoned ceramics shop and are already carrying out its reconstruction.

The cooperative is earning substantial profits. Its soviet decided to sponsor soldier/internationalists with disabilities and families of those who died. Their annual apartment payments, including all utilities, are provided for. There are currently 25 such families and, beginning next year, there will be more than 100.

There are also problems. Thus, the cooperative acquired 28 trucks which were written off by military units, but this is very little. "Naturally, we would like," said A. Petrenko, "our contacts with the Army to be beneficial and to establish them directly without intermediaries. Let us say, that we could buy trucks and equipment which are written off by the troops. But we do not know what the units have at their disposal. If we had that information here at the exhibition, we could conclude the deals right here.

A. Dzhambayev, chairman of Dzhus Cooperative from Ust-Kamenogorsk supported this idea.

"Office space is being vacated at garrisons in accordance with the Armed Forces reductions," he said. "We would like to lease them. We would agree to any conditions. For example, we can sew fur items for the Army from our own material in accordance with goszakaz [State Order]. We can transfer a portion of the profits to the Ministry of Defense account. Or, for example, we can undertake development of the social cultural life at a garrison. It is true that we have not succeeded in coming to an agreement for the time being.

Sprint Cooperative from the city of Shadrinsk in Kurgan Oblast is offering its production for the Armed Forces and DOSAAF. It manufactures modern parachute towers in its shops. They cost 60,000 [rubles] and with installation on site—less transportation costs—are 70,000 rubles. The MZhK [Oil and Fats Combine] Otrar Cost-accounting Section which operates as part of one of the major enterprises in Alma-Ata is ready to deliver a complete collection of modern, interesting trainers for gymnasiums and sports centers to Army sportsmen.

L. Solomin, exhibition organizer, president of Soyuz Cooperative Association, and reserve lieutenant colonel expressed the opinion that there can be the most varied types cooperation here. For example, in line with job placement for officers who have been transferred to the reserve, especially those who have experience in organizational work or economic activity. After completing the cooperatives' courses which operate under the association in Alma-Ata, a person can begin [performing] his cooperative duties. They are finding jobs even for those who would like to work as rank and file members of cooperatives.

The association, which carries out the functions of intermediary, is ready to lease unoccupied buildings and office space belonging to the Ministry of Defense. It will use its own funds to carry out contract orders for construction at state wage rates. Announce a competition both for the best design and for the most reliable executor of the order.

"For example, we could build the military hospital in Alma-Ata with cooperative manpower that they have been talking about for a long time," says L. Solomin. "We would also willingly undertake construction of a hospital for veterans of the Great Patriotic War and internationalists. We will find reliable contractors, just give us the order and the resources."

Visitors stop for hours on end at the stand with products of the Internationalist Cost-accounting Sector headed by Afghan veteran Sergey Kurin. The young men are just barely starting. They still cannot compete with large and major collectives but they are attempting to. They have a noble purpose—to use their profits to help strengthen military patriotic clubs in the city of Alma-Ata.

I found out, right here at the exhibition, that another soldier/internationalist, Viktor Kriventsov, has organized an independent group in the capital of Kazakhstan which is engaged in construction of a young people's residence complex for soldiers who fulfilled their international duty in Afghanistan.

The contact with the cooperatives at the exhibition was useful. I think that what they are proposing to the Ministry of Defense should be of undoubted interest. I emphasize that we are talking about real cooperatives who, by means of conscientious and effective labor, are helping the country to strengthen its economy. It is noteworthy that not one of the so-called trade-purchasing cooperatives was represented at the exhibition. Those types, as they explained to me here, do not like to appear before a wide audience, their principle is to remain in the shadows.

Pension List of Conflicts Involving Foreign Military Assistance Groups

90UM0107C Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
15 Nov 89 Second Edition p 4

[Article by Col V. Izgarshev: "The Chronic Pain of Afghanistan"]

[Excerpt] The Supreme Soviet appropriates 2.4 billion rubles to cover the cost of pensions paid out to veterans and participants in war. I asked the following question of Major General N. Bay, deputy chief of the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense: Is any part of this amount earmarked for pensions and benefits paid military internationalists?

"Of course," answered Nikolay Maksimovich. "We currently have on our directorate's rolls about 1,280,000 pensioners. That is the total number of all veterans. Of

this number, 832,000 are receiving pension benefits for completed service; 111,000, for disability; and for 239,000, their pension was granted on the grounds of loss of family breadwinner. We do not have very much money, of course. Nonetheless, we will do all we can to assure all veterans a normal way of life, even with all the financial difficulties."

You will recall that the article "The Pain of Afghanistan" (PRAVDA, 17 August 1989) lists other internationalists due government benefits. General N. Bay showed me the following list of countries in which our troops were present during times of military conflict.

Countries and Periods of Military Conflict to 1 December 1979

Country	Period of Military Conflict
North Korea	June 1950 to July 1953
Algeria	1962 to 1964
United Arab Republic (Egypt)	18 October 1962 to 1 April 1963
	1 October 1969 to 16 July 1972
	5 October 1973 to 1 April 1974
Yemen Arab Republic	18 October 1962 to 1 April 1963
Vietnam	1 July 1965 to 31 December 1974
Syria	5-13 June 1967; 6-24 October 1973
Angola	November 1975 to November 1979
Mozambique	November 1975 to November 1979
Ethiopia	9 December 1977 to 30 November 1979
Afghanistan	22 April 1979 to 30 November 1979

That is the list. I was told in the Main Personnel Administration of the Ministry of Defense that it will be brought up to date. No military internationalist will be neglected.

New Rules on Medical Certification of Draftees

90UM0107B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Nov 89 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Maj Gen of Medical Service N. Kamenskov, chief of the Central Military Medical Board, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Ye. Agapova, in the column: "A Telephone Dialog": "How Is Your Health, Draftee?"; date and place not given; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] It is no secret that, for many years, and for well-known reasons, persons suffering with various diseases, including mental retardation, were drafted for active military service. An order issued by the USSR Minister of Defense, dated 1 September 1989, has introduced substantial changes into the Statute on Medical Determination of Fitness to serve in the Armed Forces. What are these changes? To obtain an answer to this question, Ye. Agapova—our correspondent—contacted

Major General of Medical Service N. Kamenskov, who is chief of the Central Military Medical Board, USSR Ministry of Defense.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nikolay Nikolayevich, it appears that many parents of soldiers will breathe a sigh of relief once they learn of the new medical criteria for inducting people into the Army.

[Kamenskov] The new order has indeed introduced substantial changes into the Statute on Medical Determination of Fitness for service in the Armed Forces. As of now, greater demands are imposed on physicians relative to certifying the state of health of the draft-age person. For the first time, persons suffering with bronchial asthma—regardless of degree of seriousness of the disease—are no longer subject to the draft. Also not subject to the draft are persons in whom the spleen has been removed as a result of trauma, even those in which blood formation function has not been destroyed. As before, also not to be inducted are young men in whom nearsightedness or farsightedness exceeds 6.0 diopters. The new statute also incorporates changes relating to a number of illnesses. Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to list all the provisions of the order. Persons interested in acquiring additional information in this area are referred to the military commissariat. Nevertheless, I would like to mention one particular provision: Persons afflicted with mental retardation—even mild cases—will no longer be drafted.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It often happens that the medical certification process leaves room for doubt, with the examinee or his parents disagreeing with the findings reached by the draft board's physician. How are such questions resolved?

[Kamenskov] Undoubtedly, life being what it is, these things do occur. In such cases the parents have a right to appeal what they believe to be an illegal decision. They should petition the draft board at the city, oblast, or republic military commissariat. The decision made there is final. Unfortunately, there are cases of mistaken medical opinion in the selection process. In each instance, an administrative investigation is carried out at the place of occurrence. The greatest amount of errors in the recruit selection process are committed by draft boards located in the regions of Central Asia, the Far East, and the Transbaykal.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Now for the last essential question: Does the new order apply to persons who are now serving in the Army and Navy?

[Kamenskov] Yes. The new order applies to draft-age persons, members of the military serving their compulsory term of service, and military builders, with 1 October of this year as the effective date.

Komsomol Proposal on 'Voluntary' Military Training in Vuzes

90UM0175A Moscow *SOVETSKIY PATRIOT* in Russian 6 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by TASS correspondent A. Azarov: "'The Military': Battles of Local Significance"]

[Text] In late June, secretaries of the VLKSM (All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League) committees of the colleges of Moscow adopted the resolution "On Restructuring in the Sphere of Military Training for Students in Civilian Colleges." Prior to this, a vigorous movement began in a number of colleges against maintaining the format of classes at the chairs of military science and drafting the students of full-time colleges for active military service during the time of study. So, the Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League) leaders began thinking. The wave of democratization was clearly attempting to swamp the "concrete obstacles" which have protected the military science chair since as long ago as the times of Stalin.

No, our young people do not at all neglect the issues of the defense capability of our Motherland. Even the position of "pacifists" is ultimately aimed at improving the quality of training of reserve officers. This is why, having analyzed various suggestions by students, the Komsomol functionaries came to this conclusion: The introduction of volunteer training in military specialties for all young men and women without exception as soon as possible is the most reasonable and most comprehensive solution. In this manner, the professional orientation of a college is going to be taken into account most rationally. In the process, the workload of military training should be removed from the overall curriculum of students. Field camps and commissions—all of this needs to be kept. Those who do not want to do this will serve as privates after graduation.

Komsomol functionaries believe that introducing voluntary military training may provide an opportunity to radically improve the quality of reserve officer training within a short period of time, provided, of course, that the students will consciously strive for this, and inter-collegiate centers of military training will compete among themselves. For example, the military science chair could give those who so wish an opportunity to get a driver's license and provide bonuses on top of stipends from the funds of the USSR Ministry of Defense (on top of the quota of the stipend fund).

The introduction of the volunteer principle will call for a considerable effort and time. The Komsomol functionaries proposed to test the system suggested in a number of educational establishments of Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad, and the ones who so wish in the 1989-1990 school year. Subsequently, the system could be introduced universally.

The leaders of the Komsomol believe that the USSR GKNO [State Committee for People's Education] and

the Ministry of Defense should actually make and control all changes in the operation of military science chairs: certify instructors in keeping with the guidelines adopted by the GKNO, abolish mandatory self-preparation and political indoctrination classes, and abolish instructions regulating the appearance of a student...

The issue of "how one can and cannot" come out against military training remains unresolved. The students are in favor of considering the organized non-attendance of classes a form of expressing the public opinion of students. They protest against expulsions and withholding of the stipends of students for their participation in actions supporting the reorganization of the "military."

The opposite side, the administration of colleges and the military, dictate the following: Organized failures to attend classes are a gross violation of not only the rules established for colleges (in colleges, attendance is voluntary only in lecture classes), but also of the general military regulations of the USSR Armed Forces which determine mutual relations in the course of instruction at military science chairs. Nobody has the right to expel a student from his college or withhold his stipend for participating in manifestations in favor of reorganizing military training, but they have every right to do so for failing to attend classes at the military science chair (including group and collective non-attendance, and the kind which assumes the form of strikes), as well as for failing to take exams and tests before the forthcoming semester.

At present, it is clear to almost anyone that the system of military training is not in line with contemporary requirements. In the immediate future, this issue will entail consequences which are highly undesirable for the administrators unless it is resolved quickly. As the recent All-Union Student Forum showed, the government understands this. Apparently, a decision in principle is stuck in the offices of the esteemed ministry. The barn door will be closed after the horse gets out... Meanwhile, at present the students have many problems on top of the chair of military science. After all, their main task is to gain knowledge in their field. The future intellectuals of our country have their own positions on many issues of the further development of our Motherland. Do their votes matter that little in our present-day "democratic" society? After all, tomorrow, when our society indeed becomes such, one may come to miss these votes.

Statistics on Make-Up of Officer Corps

90UM0173C Moscow *SELSKAYA ZHIZN* in Russian 9 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by Captain 1st Rank A. Slobozhanyuk: "The Officers Hold a Council"]

[Text] Yesterday in the Soviet Army's Tsentralnyy Theater the All-Service Officers Meeting completed its work. The meeting was the first in the history of our Armed Forces.

First of all, a little about what an officers meeting is. It is the military's new social institution. Or, more accurately, it is something old and long-forgotten, having existed in the Russian military. It was a type of club that united the officers of an individual unit or garrison and had a fully democratic character and solid authority. Thus, we speak not of creation but rather of the restoration of a body to which today's officers attach their hopes of improving the moral atmosphere in the military units.

In the course of 2 days 1,500 officers—delegates from all the districts, groups of forces, and fleets—held a council on how to deepen the process of perestroika in the military environment, to find a way of reconciling unity of command with democracy, and to raise the prestige of the man in shoulder boards.

How does the officer corps look today? Here are a few features from its social portrait. It is composed of 75 percent Communists and 17 percent members of the Komsomol. Today there are 680 doctors of science and more than 14,000 candidates of science in the officer corps, 130 officers have received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union in the postwar period, and 82 representatives of the Armed Forces have been elected USSR people's deputies. Almost all the officers have higher education, and their median age is 32 years. Our officers were the first in the world to pilot a spacecraft into outer space. And they were the first to go where suffering people needed immediate help—at Chernobyl, Spitak, and Leninakan, in Sumgait and Stepanakert.

But there are also negative facts. A portion of the officers under the age of 30 have submitted requests to be discharged in the reserves. One of the reasons is disorder in their living conditions: Some 116,000 officers do not have their own housing today. Society is alarmed by nonregulation treatment in the soldiers' enlisted barracks and sailors' crew quarters, and the struggle against the notorious "dedovshchina" [hazing] is still far from over. Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of defense, noted in a report that many soldiers and their parents have lost faith in the justice of the commanders. And, unfortunately, not without reason. There are still boors, careerists, and dodgers of responsibility in the officer corps. Some officers have simply lost their way, unable to find themselves in the dynamic processes of perestroika. Incidentally, this was also displayed at the All-Service Officers Meeting. A number of the speeches smacked of the old ways. And there were the standard tirades and protestations. From time to time concrete problems of a sort were posed, but they were far from being the order of the day. But the agenda was entitled "The Honor and Dignity of the Soviet Officer." And by its courteous applause the audience gave the speakers to understand that the times require constructive conversation and the exchange of practical experience. Experience like that in the regiment of officer R. Aushev.

Ruslan Sultanovich proved to be a courageous man not only on the field of battle. At the time when he returned from Afghanistan seven years ago, he was already introducing perestroika to those subunits that he happened to command. His starting position was confidence in the soldier. A soldiers' honor council, created at the initiative of Aushev, already functions in his regiment. Ruslan Sultanovich delegated to the council the discretionary rights of the regimental commander. The soldiers have trusted the council to decide itself whom to encourage with a short-term leave at home, whom to commend, and whom to put under arrest and confine to the guardhouse.

Aushev has introduced many other innovations in his work. But if he had to fight practically all by himself for their implementation before, now he has the support and trust of his superiors. He also has the confidence of the people. On the uniform of the 35-year-old colonel next to a Gold Star is the badge of a USSR people's deputy. Two of his brothers have also devoted their lives to the Army. Adam is a lieutenant colonel, and Bagautdin is a major.

The youth dominated the meeting hall—the future of our Army. In the intermissions the delegates argued heatedly. And they studied with interest the exhibits displayed in the theater: Samples of prospective uniforms, new food rations, and other types of allowances were presented. There was also a somewhat unusual display there—products from military state farms and private farms and from auxiliary market gardens of military units.

The Army's social sphere is also improving, albeit slowly. The government recently passed a resolution to increase the official pay of officers starting 1 January 1990 and is introducing bonuses for levels of proficiency rating. Regulations on providing pensions for officers in the reserves are being improved, and energetic measures are being undertaken to resolve housing problems. As a result, the moral atmosphere in the military units will also become fresher. But the foundations of its cleanliness and sanctity remain, as before, duty, honor, dignity, and conscience.

L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and first deputy chairman of the USSR Defense Council, and O.D. Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in the work of the meeting.

Lt-Gen Morkovin Obituary

90UM0173A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Dec 89 First Edition p 4

[Obituary: "M.V. Morkovin"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Mikhail Vasilyevich Morkovin, retired, veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Hero of the Soviet Union, and Honored Builder of the RSFSR, passed away after a serious illness. He dedicated all of his

waking life to selfless service of the socialist homeland and the cause of the Communist Party, of which he was a member since 1942.

M.V. Morkovin was born 14 December 1920 in the village of Ishcheino in Lipetsk Oblast. In 1939 he was conscripted into the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces, where he rose through the ranks from cadet to lieutenant general. During the years of the Great Patriotic War M.V. Morkovin, commanding in succession a combat engineer platoon, company, and battalion, demonstrated personal bravery and heroism as well as superior leadership qualities under combat conditions. In the following years he graduated from the Military Engineering Academy imeni V.V. Kuybyshev and the General Staff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces imeni K.Ye. Voroshilov and served in important positions in the Main Staff of the Ground Forces and the General Staff. For a long period of time he headed the Central Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In all his official duties M.V. Morkovin demonstrated eminent competency, organizational skills, sensitivity, and an attentive attitude toward people. He took an active part in the social and political life of the country. The Soviet Homeland values highly the services of M.V. Morkovin. He has been honored with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and decorated with two Orders of Lenin and the orders of the October Revolution, the Labor Red Banner, the Patriotic War 1st Degree, the Red Star, "For service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3d Degree, and the "Badge of Honor," as well as with many medals. He has also been awarded decorations by a number of socialist countries.

We will always cherish in our hearts the memory of Mikhail Vasilyevich Morkovin.

[Signed] M.A. Moiseyev, V.I. Varennikov, N.V. Chekov, N.V. Ogarkov, S.Kh. Aganov, B.A. Omelichev, V.G. Denisov, G.F. Krivosheyev, K.I. Kobets, N.S. Kovalenko, N.A. Larin, D.A. Grinkevich, L.V. Shumilov, V.N. Gorshkov, K.M. Vertelov, F.G. Spirin, Yu.M. Ovchinnikov, O.A. Baykov, V.V. Krivoshein, Ye.A. Yevstigneyev.

First Personal Computer Class in Northern Group of Forces

90UM0173B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Dec 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major V. But: "The First Computer Class"]

[Text] Lessons on the "Korvet" personal computers were held in a school at the N garrison of the Northern Group of Forces. A computer class was recently begun here.

It all began when Mikhail Borisovich Muravin, director of the school and an expert and ardent fan of computerization, arrived here at his new place of work from Moscow. In the capital the schoolchildren had a whole computer center at their disposal. Mikhail Borisovich thought to himself: The children here deserve just as much. They received the necessary equipment. But they ran into the problem of how to set up the operators' positions. They turned for help to their patrons—the servicemen of the neighboring unit. Senior Warrant Officer O. Savenkov, Sergeant D. Denisov, Private First Class G. Kazaryan, and Privates I. Simonov and S. Timofeyev undertook to do the work.

Now the schoolchildren are "breaking in" the computer class. It is the first in the SGV (Northern Group of Forces), but we must hope that it is not the last.

Lt Gen Akchurin on Air Defense Officers' Competition

*90UM0103A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Nov 89 First Edition p 1*

[Interview with Lt Gen R. Akchurin, commander, PVO Surface-to-Air Missile Troops, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA unofficial correspondent Lt Col N. Poroskov, in the column: "Year-End Dialog": "What We Learn from Competition"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Excerpts] An outstanding event in the present training year was the First Army-Wide Officers' Competition in Field, Air, and Naval Combat Proficiency. Various competitions and contests are gaining popularity in ground forces and fleets. It appears that there are new forms of competition that are affecting the entire combat training process in the Army and Navy. Is there justification for them? Do they have a future?

The above questions were put by our unofficial correspondent to the commander of PVO Surface-to-Air Missile Troops, Lieutenant General R. Akchurin.

[Akchurin] One hears it said that the troop reduction and reorganization may lead us to lose sight of the main issue—combat readiness. In my view, there are grounds for such concern. There has recently been less spark, less drive, if you please, in combat training. The old forms of competition have been discarded, while the new ones...So now we have it that the meets, competitions, and contests are becoming some way of motivating people to improve their professional mastery and intensify their combat training. We recently had the finals of competition for best combat crew of air-to-surface missile troop battalions. The finals were preceded by competitions at the level of battalion, regiment, etc. That made it possible to include the majority of crews in the struggle for first place.

We had a second goal: to ascertain the "brakes" impeding combat training contained in the current guidelines and programs...We made useful observations in this area, also.

[Poroskov] As we know, the competition program proper was varied. In the first phase, the crews competed in physical training; knowledge of equipment and tactics; and skill in performing routine operations and combat performance standards. Air targets were merely simulated. In the second phase, there was an air defense engagement, with aircraft carrying out a raid...Finally, there were the finals, involving live fire at targets...

[Akchurin] What made this particular competition stand out was its practical orientation. In the course of the competition, we made changes in the "weighting factor" for evaluating the various disciplines. In the case of physical training it had a value of one; in executing combat performance standards, four; in firing, it was increased by a factor of up to 20 in some cases. We

introduced an incentive by awarding one point for 10-percent coverage of the combat performance standards.

The focus of attention of the commission, which consisted of officers from the Main Staff of PVO Troops and the Military Command Academy of PVO, was on the leading specialists—officers in the fields of guidance, launch, and lock-on; and commanders of missile battalions.

Were we able to accomplish all that we had planned? The competition is something new, and it is impossible to take everything into account. I believe that it will never assume a final shape; we will have to make changes as we go along. Otherwise, it will all lapse into mediocrity, as in the case of the previous forms of competition.

[Poroskov] Obsolete missiles that have been removed from operational status have for some time been used as targets on training grounds. There is no doubt that they are obsolete. But using them as targets...I have heard it said that the missiles are "difficult to catch."

[Akchurin] I understand what you mean. However, the competition put an end to those lingering "defeatist" opinions. The finalists chalked up an excellent record, showing that crew coordination and skillful handling of weapons—even those that are not the latest—do make it possible to destroy targets. So that this is not a matter of targets. The better crews were successful under conditions when the density of air attack exceeded a battalion's firepower and interference seemed to cover the radar screen.

Situations arose during firing when commanders were required to exercise tenacity, perform precise computation, and apply extensive knowledge of their equipment and tactics. For example, Lieutenant Colonel A. Shevtsov was forced to work with only one system channel. His crew destroyed two air targets and one ground target.

Another example. Captain S. Motorkin found himself in a situation to which there is usually only one solution: shifting attention to another target. The officer did not succumb to the easy standard approach, instead exercising resourcefulness and skill to destroy all targets.

The phrase "for the first time" may be used with reference to the events that occurred on the training ground. Major A. Loboda's battalion was able to perform its launches without target designation. The attempt was successful. For the first time, a battalion that was on alert status was transferred from its permanent station to take part in the competition. The purpose here was to ascertain the collective's ability to take up effective fire without preparation and in a short period of time, without becoming fully deployed, after a change of station.

[Poroskov] The contests undoubtedly uncovered problems. Changes will have to be made in the way training is organized.

[Akchurin] Yes, the competition did point out areas requiring improvement in combat skills. We will attach more importance to firing at ground targets in the new training year. We must train specialists more intensively in working under conditions of noise jamming and use of antiradar missiles. Especially important here is fire at "invisible" targets.

Another conclusion we made was that officers did not do well working with maps. It is not possible to coordinate fire interaction of battalions without proper use of maps. The optico-television guidance channel is employed extremely rarely. The competitions also brought out the fact that the operations duty officer must be used as much as possible as tactical control officer. Until the commander arrives at the command post, he essentially is in charge of combat.

The list of problems uncovered by the contests is considerably longer, of course. I cited only a few of them; they are now being analyzed, with the intent of eliciting the strong and weak points of combat training.

Introducing Personal Computers to Armed Forces

90UM0160A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Dec 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel S. Pashentsev, Military Pilot 1st Class, and Major M. Yudin, Navigator-Programmer: "Nothing But Talk?"]

[Text] Much is being written and said today about the urgent need for introducing personal computers in our army. A single letter is not enough to list all the tasks that can be handled by personal computers in aviation, for example, because their range is so broad. Let us mention a few: the preparation and execution of navigation calculations; the evaluation of the flight and tactical capabilities of one's own and enemy aircraft; estimation of the elements of combat maneuvering for forthcoming flights; analysis of tactical air superiority and a choice of the optimal maneuver to gain it; checking flight personnel's knowledge of the potential enemy and its armaments; administration of tests on aviation technology maintenance rules and the knowledge of special flight

cases; accounting for fuel conservation by each pilot and technician, and so on. But in real life things have not moved beyond just talking. Everybody agrees with, and understands the need, but the reservations made mention the absence of computers, of a center to write and distribute specialized Air Force software, and of specialist training facilities. Finally, there is no money. So, continue to be daring on your own and wait for better times to come.

And daring individuals do appear! We buy computers with our own money or occasionally assemble them with our own hands and learn the ABCs of programming on our own. We write software for our everyday work and use it in practice. Unfortunately, this experience has not spread to the entire Air Force. But the enthusiasts find ways to exchange software despite the fact that personal computers are widely diverse and incompatible. It turns out more often than not that "the bicycle is being re-invented," since several people are doing the same thing.

One cannot claim that this work is not under way in the Air Force at all, but right now it is geared towards using the PCs available in the units as part of various equipment and simulators. These machines are bulky, as a rule, consume a lot of power, require a large body of servicing personnel and are difficult to operate. The most important thing is that they are located far from the workplaces. Can one seriously believe that a squadron commander, for example, will rush into a neighboring building housing mainframe computers dozens of times a day to get a piece of information?

We believe, therefore, that providing the Air Force with the required number of microcomputers represents one of the most important problems today, at a time when the Armed Forces are being cut back and when the standards of combat training have to be drastically enhanced.

The second problem lies in the need for instituting centralized training of our own programmers and establishing a single center for writing and distributing software programs in the Air Force. Such a center could be set up at an institution of higher learning or at a flight training center.

We would like to stress the fact that the computerization of the Air Force will go a long way towards getting rid of a paper flood which has virtually swept over the units.

Shortcomings in Repair Services to Naval Auxiliaries

90UM0085A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank S. Tyukachev: "Until Trouble Strikes"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA received a letter from the Northern Fleet. The writer—Yuriy Belenchenko—works as a seaman aboard an oceangoing tugboat. He wrote of serious shortcomings existing in the organization of services to auxiliary ships. By request of the editors, the ship was visited by journalist Captain 3rd Rank S. Tyukachev.

I will start off by citing two remarks Yu. Belenchenko makes in his letter. One is: "While the ship was laid up for repairs, I approached the persons in command to tell them that the work is defective. However, they could care less. All they were interested in was to see the vessel return to sea duty as soon as possible, since the crew was being paid 90 percent of their salary while the ship was undergoing repairs." The other remark is: "When the time came to turn over the ship to the command authorities, a captain 3rd rank arrived and signed the documents, knowing that the caps and doors were not properly sealed and that the lifeboats were not seaworthy. I could not believe that my eyes saw something like this happening in the Navy."

The repair completion certificate for the tugboat was signed by a Captain 3rd Rank A. Mysnik, among others. It was he whom the letter writer in mind.

"I knew that the lifeboats were not seaworthy," the division engineer said openly in our conversation, "but I knew something else, also. In the next 3 or 4 weeks, the crew was to be provided with new lifesaving gear. That is why the certificate was signed."

"Was the crew required to carry out tasks at sea in the absence of reliable lifesaving gear on board?"

"It was. For example, towing targets for gunnery practice. And a number of other tasks."

"What if an emergency situation were to occur?"

"We would not have been left without assistance," said Chief Engineer N. Kazarin, joining the conversation.

Incidentally, variations on the theme of "nothing serious happening after the tug was repaired, therefore there was no cause for worry" came out of the mouths of many officials with whom I was able to converse. The only thing one can say is that they were merely hoping for the best. There is a short distance separating this kind of psychology and serious trouble. All the more in this case: a vessel that had seen many years of service under difficult northern conditions.

In the opinion of Captain 3rd Rank V. Dubovskiy, the oceangoing tugboat we are discussing indeed does not offer much in the way of seaworthiness for this day and age.

"In the near future," said the officer, "she will be assigned to the category of 'warmers.' In other words, she will be kept moored for the purpose of warming neighboring vessels. This being so, she does not have long to go as far as sea duty is concerned."

For the time being, however, the tug is still considered to be on the list of forces on constant combat readiness. This was attested to by the blue flag with white stripe in the middle flying on the mast as I boarded ship to speak with the writer of the letter.

Yuriy Belenchenko was in his quarters. It seemed as if he had "set up" the situation prior to meeting with me. The room was dirty and uncomfortable. The letter writer's appearance, in comparison with that of the other crew members, could certainly be improved: a puffed-up face; a blue denim jacket that had seen better days. The same could be said about his trousers. In a word, Yuriy looked like anything but a "fighter for justice." He looked more like a person that had been seriously wronged and could not rise above that.

"Yuriy Belenchenko was certainly treated unfairly, having been transferred from seaman's duties to orderly," said tugboat Boatswain Vladimir Komarov, confirming my suspicions. "The captain was looking for an excuse for some time, of course. In a word, they got even with him. They got even with him because of the troubles he caused the tugboat command authorities and the unit with his claims and complaints."

Yu. Belenchenko even after being disciplined did not come to terms with the situation, which dragged on for years aboard the tugboat.

"Many violations are being committed aboard the tugboat," he told me. "I have never seen a doctor board the craft. The firemen are not provided with soap. For 6 months the boatswain and I kept asking the clinic for help in sanitizing the boat."

Yu. Belenchenko's feelings are shared by Seamen P. Fetisov, O. Kazakov, A. Lapshinov, A. Kuvshinov, and other crew members with whom I was able to speak. The firemen's situation is certainly not a matter of a year or so. The fact here is that there are virtually no auxiliary vessels of this type—burning solid fuel—remaining in the Navy. That is to say, ships that require coal. I was told at headquarters that this oceangoing tugboat is unique. This is the only place where the fireman's specialty still exists. It has become harder, not easier. The partial mechanization has determined the low quality of coal being supplied by the depot.

"It is not easy for the firemen to maintain steam 'at the mark,' said tugboat Chief Engineer N. Kazarin. "Especially for young lads. And the pay is low, compared to the physical stress and working conditions."

As I mentioned above, the craft was on standby duty on the day I met the writer of the letter. Orders called for the boat to be in a state of readiness for sea duty at all times.

"This is the third day we are trying to leave the dock," said Boatswain B. Komarov. "The steering gear is defective. It is shearing bolts. It is possible that we ourselves will be forced to ask for assistance while at sea. We are a combat element in name only."

The above is the technical readiness of the oceangoing tugboat as she carries out her duties as a Navy rescue unit. I had a chance to observe a shipboard exercise carried out by the ship's officers. The purpose of the exercise was to test the readiness of the GKP [primary control station] team, the navigator, and the BIP [combat information center] to man the ship under autumn and winter conditions. Executive Officer S. Sutuyev, who was temporarily functioning as the captain, was assigned two tactical training tasks by the inspecting officers. One involved passing a fast-moving target. The second task pertained to negotiating narrow waters with the use of special navigation equipment. The crew did not accomplish either task. The result was an unsatisfactory rating. At the same time, in the logbook there was an entry forbidding the boat on standby duty to undertake sea duty, due to insufficient professional training on the part of the GKP team. This was not only a case of a malfunctioning steering gear.

In all fairness, I must say that the tugboat situation is improving, albeit slowly. Yu. Belenchenko in his letter stated that the craft is not equipped with lifesaving gear. It was true that until recently the boat was carrying two dilapidated lifeboats. They were written off. Now there are two inflatable liferafts and one lifeboat. They are large enough to carry the entire crew after it abandons ship over both sides, if necessary. Thus, the just complaints of Belenchenko and his comrades have been heard by the unit command authorities. However, the crew still has quite a number of other problems that also demand immediate resolution.

Lack of Survival Clothing Continues to Plague Navy

90UM0184A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Dec 89 First Edition p 2

[Commentary by Captain 1st Rank V. Bobrovskiy, submarine unit commander, Baltic Fleet, under the rubric "Letter to the Editor": "All Hands... Below?"]

[Text] The circumstances surrounding the death of Captain 1st Rank A. Nekrasov, submarine commander, were

related at sufficient length in the article "They Returned to Base Without Their Commander," written by Captain 2d Rank A. Pilipchuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, and published on 18 July. Our unit's collective suffered this tragedy in March 1989, but it still continues to trouble our memory today. It is doubly hard on me because I was on board the submarine too. Time has passed, but I still find myself analyzing the situation every so often. My conclusions are not comforting: Any member of the crew who had fallen overboard without survival clothing in those weather conditions would have been doomed to death (although I continue to suffer the feeling of guilt of an officer in charge who did not insist that the commander execute every possible safety precaution).

This is the first time in more than 20 years of service that I have written to a newspaper. I was moved to write this letter by the paragraph describing the latest tragedy involving a military aircraft in the Pacific Fleet, from which I understood that the death of the crewmen occurred once more because of a lack of survival clothing in the Navy. Only a couple of weeks ago I happened to be in charge of the departure of several submarines to the open sea. Our route encompassed the Barents, Norwegian, and North Seas, which "treated" us to whole gales. For many days I could not stop thinking about how to guarantee the safety of the men, especially those standing the underway watch above decks (the commanders, watch officers, and quartermaster-signalmen).

At the same time, how was I to reconcile the safety of the underway watch with the overall safety of the submarines themselves? Could I send everybody below? But in that case I could not guarantee that the situation would be monitored, which might lead to a much worse circumstance—a collision. Standing together with the commander on a bridge flooded with icy water in those same ill-fated chemical suits (our sole defense from the water). I must confess that I thought it would nice if I could have beside me all that time, in that same clumsy clothing, tied by those same chains of protective belts, the representatives of those services that are responsible for survival clothing.

Inasmuch as I did not see an answer in the newspaper to the article "They Returned to Base Without Their Commander," I have come to the conclusion that decisive and, most importantly, speedy measures to provide submariners with survival clothing are not being taken.

From the editor. The sailors on submarines continue to have a vital interest in the issue of creating survival clothing that is able to protect the wearer from water and cold and keep him afloat if he falls overboard. In the meantime, the appropriate rear services of the Navy say nothing on this subject. Is it not time to break the silence?

History of Development of Early Soviet Submarine
90UM0136A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Nov 89 First Edition p 4

[Article by Captain 1st Rank A. Grigoryev: "An 'L-55' Changes Hands: Little-Known Pages of History"]

[Text] In 1925 the Soviet government made the decision to build its own submarines. Naturally the question arose: Would we be able to create modern submarines without the aid of foreign specialists? Many experts believed that we would not succeed: Because of a ten-year break in planning and construction, we had lost contact with the most experienced specialists. They suggested we purchase a submarine abroad and build our own using it as a model.

But there were doubts that the capitalist countries would sell the Bolsheviks a modern submarine. Someone remembered that 6 years earlier a British "L-55" submarine had been sunk in Koporskiy Bay. If only we could raise it!..

In autumn 1927 the location of the submarine was precisely determined using surveillance-type sweeping. The shipbuilders working on the project to build the future "Decemбрист", the first Soviet submarine, were openly delighted: They now had the opportunity to acquaint themselves with an up-to-date British submarine of 1918 construction. Our shipbuilders were especially interested in its great speed (surface—17.3 knots, submerged—10.5 knots).

The raising of the submarine was entrusted to the Expedition for Special Assignment Raising Operations (EPRON). It was headed by L.N. Zakharov. The decision was made to raise the sunken submarine with the aid of the rescue catamaran Commune, which had been built at Petrograd in 1915 especially to raise sunken ships.

The "L-55" was raised on 11 August and delivered to one of the Kronstadt docks that same day. An initial examination of the submarine showed that it went down as the result of an external explosion of great force. The hole in the area of the control room measured 12 meters lengthwise.

It became clear that the submarine was hit in the conning tower by an artillery shell, which did not damage the pressure hull. The submarine immediately tried to dive, but in the process it snagged its bow planes on the

mooring cable of one of the mines that the British themselves had placed in the area in abundance. The mine was dragged against the hull, and the explosion took place.

The bodies of the British sailors were carefully taken off. A short time later 42 coffins with the remains of the dead sailors were loaded on board the British transport Truro at the Big Kronstadt roadstead. This action of the red soldiers was acknowledged abroad as a chivalrous deed.

At the dock the Soviet engineers turned their attention to the straight form of the submarine's stem—they doubted it could generate such a high speed. The only way to check it was to restore the submarine and test it under real conditions.

The Baltic Shipbuilding Factory was charged with the restoration of the "Englishwoman." B.M. Malinin, creator of the first Soviet submarine, was justifiably proud that they were able to reproduce with great accuracy all the destroyed structures on the foreign vessel even though no plans were found aboard the submarine. Sketches found in the notebooks of several officers provided only a little help.

The sea trials of the restored "L-55" debunked the myth of its high speeds, as mentioned in the "Jane" directory. It turned out that, even at the diesel engines' full power and despite a careful cleaning and the excellent condition of the external surface, the "Englishwoman" never was able to give more than 13 knots.

Today, analyzing the past, we can try to answer whether the raising of the British submarine benefited us. Undoubtedly it did. The Soviet shipbuilders gained confidence in their abilities: As they created the "Decemбрист" they had the opportunity to compare the work they had done or were planning with the real achievements of such a mighty naval power as the United Kingdom. And, of course, the fact that a British submarine was sailing under the flag of the Country of the Soviets at that time became very important too.

The submarine, joining the fighting ships of the Baltic fleet in 1931, spent about 10 years in the ranks. Before the Great Patriotic War it was judged obsolete and turned over for scrap. But it had served its purpose. It had been a genuine training ground for many generations of sailors.

Military Technology: Italian Mini-Sub, U.S. Lockheed ES-3A*90UM0177A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Dec 89 First Edition p 3*

[Report by V. Belyayev: "Review of Military Technology"]

[Text]

Italian Mini-Submarine

Despite the fact that attention has been focused primarily on the construction of large nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines over recent decades, the foreign press notes that many specialists nonetheless believe "bigger is not better." The subject is designs for mini-submarines. Yes, the history of the development of submarines is repeating itself. Everyone knows the circumstances of the development and use of mini-submarines in Germany, Japan, and Italy in the course of World War II. However, the submarines did not come into wide use. Their design was still too imperfect.

And now we come around full circle. But this time, as Western experts believe, everything will be as it should. Supermodern technology, materials, and achievements in the various fields of engineering, including non-naval fields, will guarantee the result.

The American journal INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, in particular, described the latest exhibition of naval technology, "Mostra Navale" to readers in one of its issues. Displays characterizing the status of work on the mini-submarine in Italy were presented there, according to the journal. The 3GST9 submarine with a displacement of 27-29 tons was demonstrated at one of the stands (see photo [not reproduced]). It invariably attracted the attention of specialists of both industrial and military circles.

The submarine has a length of about 10 meters, an internal diameter of 2.2 meters, and a height of 3.5 meters. It has a crew of two men. Its range is 100 miles at a speed of 8 knots and 200 miles at a speed of 6 knots. It has a normal operating depth of 430 meters although, as the author of the review emphasizes, during trials the submarine dove to far greater depths—more than 1,000 meters.

The submarine's primary function is to deliver mines secretly to the internal waters of an enemy and carry out special operations (it can carry 12 "Manta" mines on board). The journal notes that its electronic systems resemble those aboard aircraft. It has a navigational system with gyroscope platforms. There is also a satellite navigational system for determining location more precisely.

The submarine's propulsion unit consists of a single 60-horsepower diesel engine. Its design resembles that of engines with a closed cycle of operation using oxygen gas. The gas is located in the hull, which is made up of toroidal chambers welded together. Each such chamber has a tubular diameter of 76 mm. They are located along the entire length of the submarine's hull. The normal pressure

of the oxygen is 275-340 kgf/sq cm. According to the opinions of experts, the diesel engine is more economical than electric motors, although the latter will also be used for the final stage of sailing when it is necessary to approach the target quietly.

It is reported that the first experimental mini-submarine was put in the water last year in September. Moreover, three submarines have already been sold, although the buyers were not named. It is known that American firms are taking part in the development of the project and will guarantee financing for further work.

Representatives for the firm "Maritalia" (it is the primary creator of the 3GST9 submarine) have officially reported that they are studying a design for a larger submarine—one with a displacement of 150 tons and a range of 1600 miles. The length of its hull will be 27.1 meters and the internal diameter will be 3.8 meters. Underwater speed will be 10 knots and surface speed will be 25 knots. It was stressed that a diesel propulsion unit with closed cycle of operation will again be used in the construction of the submarine. It was also declared that, according to the opinion of the firm, such engines could also be used appropriately on submarines with a displacement of 800-1,400 tons. Designs for such submarines are being studied at the design office of "Maritalia."

Carrier-Based Reconnaissance Aircraft

According to a report of the Western press, in September 1989 the "Lockheed" company began flight tests on the first experimental ES-3A carrier-based aircraft (see picture [not reproduced])—a modified version of the well-known S-3A "Viking" carrier-based antisubmarine aircraft. Its mission is the conduct of signals intelligence. A distinctive feature of the aircraft is the presence of more than 60 deflectors on the fuselage, under which are located sensors and antennas.

The airframe of the ES-3A is analogous to that of the antisubmarine version. Its wings are set high and have a span of 21 meters and a sweep angle of 15°. The length of the aircraft is 16.3 meters and its height is 6.9 meters. Its design permits the outboard sections of the wings and the vertical tail to be folded. This is a necessary precondition if the aircraft is to be based aboard a carrier.

The propulsion unit consists of 2 TRDD [turbojet bypass engines], each with a thrust of 4,210 kilograms. The engines have a low specific fuel consumption, which keeps the reconnaissance aircraft in the air longer. That is important for patrolling.

As JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY writes, the ES-3A aircraft should be a component of a unified system of passive over-the-horizon detection of BGPHEs [expansion unknown] of U.S. Navy strike carrier task forces.

Compared to the "Viking," the journal notes, the cockpit of the ES-3A has undergone several changes. All the

piloting equipment has been moved to the primary pilot's position. The copilot, who will now play the role of signals intelligence operator, has access to the appropriate instruments and systems, including several color monitors for situation representation. There are also substantial changes in the antisubmarine operator's compartment. All the antisubmarine equipment has been taken out, and in its place signals intelligence equipment, a satellite navigation system, computer processors for coding information, etc. have been installed.

The "Lockheed" company received 66 million dollars from the Navy command to develop the ES-3A aircraft (it was begun 3 years ago). If you consider that 16 aircraft will be modified in all, then the total cost of the contract will reach 154 million dollars. The new reconnaissance aircraft should be replacing the carrier-based EA-3B "Skywarrior" aircraft, which is currently used for similar purposes. According to information from the Western press, the experimental operation of the two first models will be concluded in May 1991.

Petrov Commentary on U.S. Forces, Policies in Pacific Area

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[Commentary by Colonel Yu. Petrov: "The Pentagon's Asian Headquarters"]

[Text] The Asian-Pacific Ocean region has been drawing the attention of American strategists more and more strongly. And this is apparent first of all because of the energetic measures underway in recent years and even months to improve the organizational structure of the U.S. disposition of armed forces in the region of the Pacific Ocean, to increase the combat capabilities of the Navy's troops and forces there, and to give them a greater offensive emphasis.

Today this force numbers more than 500,000 servicemen, 3 Army divisions and 1 separate brigade, one expeditionary division and one brigade of Marines, about 190 tanks, 580 guns and mortars, about 1,000 Navy and Air Force aircraft, and more than 170 fighting ships, including 7 aircraft carriers and about 30 ships equipped with "Tomahawk" cruise missiles.

In Alaska this July a regional U.S. Armed Forces command element was created with operational subordination to the commander in chief of joint forces in this zone. The command is made up of the Army's 6th Light Infantry Division and units and subunits of the U.S. Air Force command element in the zone of Alaska. In all, there are more than 21,000 personnel and about 250 airplanes and helicopters of Air Force and Army combat and auxiliary aviation. Next year the Air Force command element may be reorganized into a new air force. Previously the forces in Alaska were subordinate to the corresponding staffs of the branches of the armed forces and were intended first and foremost for the defense of Alaska. But now they are gathered into a single concentrated attack force.

A command for U.S. Armed Forces special operations in the Pacific Ocean zone is in the process of being constituted. Long-term plans for the new command include the creation in the near future of new land, air, and sea subunits for operations in the Far East and Southeast Asia.

Still one more new command element was created in October: A U.S. Army command in the Pacific Ocean zone. Subordinate to it are two light divisions and one infantry division as well as other Army units and subunits stationed in Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, and South Korea. The personnel of this command number 70,000 servicemen.

The "light" combined units, as can be seen, make up the basis of the U.S. ground forces in the region. Working in coordination with special-purpose troops, they are most opportunely suited, as the Pentagon believes, for conducting various combat operations, and offensive operations in particular, in regions that are isolated and weakly equipped from a strategic standpoint.

After activating the 482d Tactical Fighter Airwing in Northern Japan in 1987 and incorporating aircraft stationed in Alaska into the force, the U.S. Air Force gained the ability to mount an offensive attack in the Pacific Ocean zone, with the use of nuclear weapons, along the territory of the USSR from Chukotka and Kamchatka to the Primorskiy region and Sakhalin Island.

The wide-scale reorganization of the disposition of U.S. armed forces in the Pacific Ocean zone that is being conducted undoubtedly will also entail changes in operational and combat training of the staffs, combined units, and units stationed here. The proof of this is the "Pacex" exercise of the armed forces of the U.S. and its allies, which is unprecedented in its scale, the number of participants, and the range of problems it resolves. Taking part in it were more than 200,000 servicemen, about 600 combat aircraft of the Air Force and Navy, and 200 fighting ships, including 4 carrier forces and 2 assault forces headed by battleships that were equipped with nuclear cruise missiles.

There have not been any war games like it conducted in the Pacific Ocean since the time of the World War II. In the course of this exercise and the "Autumn Forge" NATO maneuvers, which took place at the same time, an attempt was made to verify the ability of the American war machine to conduct a global war using conventional weapons simultaneously in two theaters of war. In the process, one version of the conduct of operations was played out practically in immediate proximity to the national border of the Soviet Union along its entire length from Chukotka to the Primorskiy region.

In this manner the military-political leadership of the United States continues to implement an intensive and comprehensive improvement of its armed forces in the East. And that cannot help but awaken the anxiety and apprehension of the peoples living in the countries of the Asian-Pacific Ocean area.

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